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ABSTRACT
In April of 1990, Boston's Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union,
Local 26, in a visionary attempt to mitigate the housing
affordability crisis created by, among other things, high
housing prices and the weakening purchasing power of its
membership's already low incomes, instituted an unprecedented
employer-assisted Housing Trust Fund (HTF). Now that the HTF is
operative, the union and its organizationally separate housing
arm, the United Neighborhood Assistance Corporation (UNAC), want
to understand how this resource can be combined with other
federal, state and local housing programs to expand affordable
housing opportunities for its membership.
To this end, the first part of this paper discusses the present
U.S. housing crisis. This is tempered with a description of the
union's progressive past, with attention focused on the
environement that created the impetus behind the employer-
contributed HTF.
The paper then goes on to describe workers housing and financial
conditions and UNAC's attempt to mitigate these conditions
through their HTF-financed housing program. This discussion
focuses on the potential leveraging opportunities that exist
under the 1990 Affordable Housing Act and various state and
local supply-side housing programs. The paper concludes by
providing a "shopping list" of challenges and issues the will
union face or must resolve before it can provide any affordable
housing opportunities.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Phillip Clay
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
American employers have been lamenting over the dearth of
affordable housing for low-wage employees since the days of
the Pullman company towns. As employers have become more
cognizant of the housing affordability issue, new and
innovative approaches at attacking this problem have been
produced. Today, many corporations are operating or financing
housing programs for some of their employees.1 These programs
include subsidies for apartments, homes, mortgages and
buildings lots. Substantial sums are also spent for
relocation assistance for transferred and newly hired workers,
as a company-wide benefit, or as a benefit for senior
management. Predictably, this issue has received much
attention and action on behalf of management-level employees,
but little substantive movement has been made toward
increasing lower-level, service sector employees capacity to
afford housing, either for ownership or rental. In Boston
however, a more definitive remedy to this problem has been
sought.
In April of 1990, Boston's Hotel and Restaurant Workers'
Union, Local 26, in a visionary attempt to mitigate the
housing affordability crisis created by, among other things,
'David Schwartz et al. A New Housing Policy for America.
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988) p. 104.
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high housing prices and the weakening purchasing power of its
membership's already low incomes, instituted an unprecedented
employer-contributed Housing Trust Fund (HTF). Under this
fund, 13 hotels and other Boston establishments covered by the
Local 26 contract contribute 5 cents for each hour worked to a
housing trust fund for union members.
Now that the Trust is operative, and totals close to $1.5
million, the union and its organizationally separate housing
arm, the Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation (UNAC),
want to understand how this resource can be used to meet its
memberships' diverse and pressing housing needs.
Engaging in a study that sheds light on this concern
requires an analysis of (1) union members' housing and
financial conditions; (2) the preliminary HTF-financed UNAC
Housing Program , which is to address the housing
affordability issue and (3) the financial leveraging
opportunities that exist under state, local and federal
housing subsidy programs. Of primary interest to the union is
the following question: Given the members low-incomes, how
can UNAC combine its HTF-financed UNAC Housing Program with
other organizations' resources and federal, state and local
government housing programs to meet workers' housing needs?
In answering this question, this thesis will describe and
evaluate UNAC's Housing Program with the hope of guiding its
future development so that it may fully satisfy members' unmet
housing needs. Moreover, such a study will illustrate the
benefits and problems of instituting a housing trust fund and
in doing so, provide assistance and encouragement to other
unions who want to develop housing programs to ameliorate the
housing affordability problem.
The background section to this thesis will provide an
overview of the current U.S. housing crisis, while providing
insight into the context in which workers look for housing.
Specifically, this section will look to the "causes and
effects" of the present housing crisis noting that the
problems are not one dimensional -- they are multi-faceted and
interconnected -- but rather, vary from rising housing cost
and a decreasing rental stock to changing demographics and the
federal government retreat from providing low- and moderate-
income housing assistance.
Chapter 1 will then discuss the history of the
International Union and Local 26 through the lens of the
progressive policies it has instituted from organizing the
uhskilled and having labor uhions honor picket lines to the
more recent implementation of the legal services and housing
trust funds. A preponderance of this chapter will describe
the environment -- political, economic and social -- that
created the impetus for the employer-contributed HTF. Such a
description is useful in that it illustrates how a union, with
Local 26's innovative and active background could even
conceive of the uncharacteristic and "non-labor issue" task of
requesting for a collective bargaining right to employer-
contributed housing assistance. -
Chapter 2 goes on to describe the current economic and
housing characteristics of workers and Local 26's attempt to
mitigate these conditions through the HTF-supported UNAC
Housing Program, paying close attention to the separate
distributional issues that accompany any allocation of this
scarce HTF resource. This chapter ultimately notes that the
financial support provided through the HTF cannot resolve all
the workers housing needs, but that efforts to mitigate these
problems can be augmented if HTF monies are leveraged
with the multitude of often confusing and disjointed housing
programs offered through federal, state and local housing
programs.
Chapters 3 and 4 depart from this point and examine how
UNAC can combine its resources with the bevy of housing
programs available under the 1990 National Affordable Housing
Act and various state and local housing programs to increase
affordable housing opportunities for members. Providing a
description of such opportunities requires a thorough analysis
of both the HOME and HOPE programs contained in the 1990 Act
and recent city and state supply-side housing efforts that
make homeownership more affordable for moderate- and low-
income people.
The thesis concludes by identifying some of the key
obstacles and strategic considerations that the union must
take into account in structuring an effective housing program
while looking at the benefits of involving unions in housing
development. This description ultimately highlights the
legal, political, and economic challenges that Local 26 and
UNAC, or any other union, are likely to confront in trying to
break into the housing and community development field.
BACKGROUND
The U.S. Affordable Housing Crisis
The United States is currently in the midst of the worst
housing crisis since the post World War II era, with a nation-
wide shortage of homes and apartments affordable to people
with low- and moderate-incomes, and an increasing homeless
population.' The underlying problem is the "affordability
gap". That is, the difference between what a person can
afford to pay for housing expenses and what it cost to rent or
purchase an apartment or home. This crisis is not a new
phenomena, especially for the poor, but what has changed, and
alarmed many people, is that an increasing portion of working
middle class households are finding this a problem as well.2
The overall impact of this affordability gap, which is
affected by all segments of the housing environment, has been
a sharp decline in homeownership rates with people being
pushed out of the rental market closer and closer to
homelessness. What is at once interesting, yet makes this
problematic, is that the crisis is not one dimensional.
Rather, the roots of this problem are multi-faceted and
interconnected and vary from rising housing cost and a
'Peter Drier and John Atlas. "Grass Roots Strategies for
the Housing Crisis: A National Housing Agenda." Social Policy.
(Winter 1989) p. 26.
2 David C. Schwartz et al. A New Housing Policy for America:
Recapturing the American Dream. (Philadelphia, PA: Temple
University Press, 1988) p. 4.
decreasing rental stock to changing demographics and the
federal government's retreat from providing low- and moderate-
income housing assistance.
Homeownership
The dream of homeownership is but a passing thought for most
low-income people and it is an idea that is fast fading for a
significant portion of the working and middle class.3 After
World War II, federal programs such as the Veterans and
Federal Housing Administrations' insurance spurred
homeownership rates for thirty years, reaching a peak
homeownership of 65.6 percent in 1980. Since then, the rate
has declined, particularly amongst those in the prime years of
new household formation (below age 35). For example, among 30
to 34 year olds, the homeownership rate has dropped from 61.1
percent in 1980 to 53.6 percent in 1989. The magnitude of
this problem is more clearly illustrated for households age
25-34. In this age group, only 12 percent had both the income
and the accumulated wealth necessary to buy the representative
starter home in 1989.4
3Peter Drier and John Atlas. "Grass Roots Strategies for
the Housing Crisis: A National Housing Agenda." Social Policy.
(Winter 1989) p. 25.
4William Apgar, The State of the Nations Housing, 1990
(Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, 1990), p. 16.
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This decline in the homeownership rate is due, in large
part, to high housing cost and increasing interest rates.5
Even though home prices have declined in many parts of the
nation, they are "unlikely to ease" and have remained
sufficiently high so that low-income homeownership
opportunities are still limited.' Even without these high
home prices, the after-tax cash cost of owning (which is
defined as the cost of mortgage payment, insurance payment,
real estate taxes, maintenance and utilities less the tax
savings from owning) has risen drastically to $8,559 which is
significantly above the inflation adjusted levels for most of
the 1970s. Also, the drop in nominal interest rates that
occurred after 1981 shot up drastically in 1990, hovering
around 10 and 11 percent.8 This increase places a further
financial burden on the home owner by increasing the mortgage
payment of principal and interest.
The reduction in homeownership is further exacerbated by
the mortgage underwriting criteria promulgated by those
lending institutions who participate in the secondary mortgage
market, which buys mortgage loans from financial institutions
that originate mortgages, via the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
5Ibid. p. 7.
'Ibid. p. 1.
7Ibid. p. 7.
8Executive Office of Communities and Development.
Massachusetts Housing Report. (Boston: Executive Office of
Communities and Development October 1990) p. 10.
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Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association.
These national institutions set underwriting guidelines,
including the limits on the size of the mortgage payment in
relation to income and the downpayment percentage. For
example, between 1984-1987 the percentage of lenders willing
to make home mortgages for more than 90 percent of value (i.e.
10% downpayment) fell sharply. This came, in part, as a
result of changed underwriting criteria in the secondary
mortgage market which created increased income requirements
and rising mortgage rates. Even now, prevailing lending
practices of not allowing households to pay more than 28
percent of their income to housing cost and requiring a 20
percent downpayment, has cut homeownership opportunities for
low-, moderate- and middle-income groups.
Both the income and downpayment requirements influence
one another. Most young households, which are primarily the
first-time homebuyers, often do not have the cash required for
aownpayment and closing cost and/or income required for
mortgage. Yet, resolving this problem does not simply entail
lowering the downpayment. The dependent relationship that
exist between these two elements requires that as the
downpayment is lowered, the income required to qualify for the
mortgage must rise due to the increase in the loan amount.
Thus, with these stringent underwriting criteria and the
dependent relationship between income and downpayment, it is
no wonder that homeownership rates have been steadily
declining in recent years.'
Rental Market
The homeownership problem does not exist in isolation,
rather it impacts the rental market. Because so many
potential homeowners have become disgruntled renters, demand
for apartments have increased. Some of this affect can be
traced to increasing rents throughout the last 10 years. In
1987, the median gross rent stood at $411; a 16 percent
increase over 1980.10 In the mid-1970s, the typical renter
paid between 23 and 24 percent of his or her total annual
income to rent. Today that figure stands at well over 30
percent. Although this problem is disheartening, it is
particularly so for the poor. Close to 11 million low income
families pay over 35 percent of their income for rent, while
another 5 million pay over 50 percent of their incomes."
A closer look at the environment confronting the poor
illustrates the true magnitude and complexity of this crisis.
As young, middle class persons, who formerly would have
9William Apgar, The State of the Nation's Housing, 1990.
(Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, 1990) p. 14.
10Ibid. p. 14.
"Peter Drier and John Atlas. "Grass Roots Strategies for
the Housing Crisis: A National Housing Agenda." Social Policy.
(Winter 1988) p. 29.
purchased homes, but who have been squeezed out of the housing
market, look for places to rent, a greater demand is placed on
existing rental units which puts upward pressure on rental
cost. The affects of this can be seen in the decreasing
affordability of the nation's rental housing stock in relation
to income that has occurred over the last decade and a half.
In the period from 1975-1984, real gross rents rose by 18
percent, while the median income of renters fell by
approximately 12 percent.12 What is partially occurring is
that real income is declining among the poor, while real rents
are climbing in lower-rent units. The effect of this
unchecked problem is borne out intuitively when one considers
that low-income units have been lost to upgrading,
abandonment, foreclosure and condominium conversion for the
last 30 years. This chain of events has created a dearth of
affordable housing and thereby a large increase in rental
cost.
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) has taken direct measures to mitigate the decline in
low-income housing units, principally by making prepayment of
federally-assisted mortgages on low-income housing
developments extremely difficult under Title VI of the 1990
National Affordable Housing Act. Title VI, which replaces the
Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act, offers
"James Brown and Charles Yinger. Homeownership
(Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, 1988) p. 7-
10.
incentives to owners of low-income housing projects to keep
their properties affordable, while a convoluted and
beleaguering process is available to those who want to opt out
through prepayment. Although these efforts are laudable, the
Bush administration's level of commitment to this program is
still unclear. Moreover, even with this lip service to
preserve federally-assisted units, there still exist a lack of
affordable units, and with a bent toward a supply-side housing
policy under the 1990 Act new construction of these units does
not appear imminent.
Demographic Changes
Demographic changes in the American population have also
contributed to the housing crisis. Although household growth
is expected to slowdown, construction is expected to increase
in the 1990s. The unfortunate product of this growth is that
it will primarily occur in the trade-up market, which is
comprised of affluent homeowners, and not in the stock of
housing that is available to low-income homeowners and
renters. To complicate this problem, we can expect a sharp
upturn in the number of persons living alone and a large
increase in the number of single-parent, female-headed
household that have been created by recent social trends
toward delayed marriage and child-bearing, as well as high
rates of divorce and teenage pregnancy -- population sectors
which tend to have lower incomes and smaller family sizes. 3
These forces coupled with the expected large increase in the
population of young families in prime first-time home buying
years (30-45) will place strains on the housing market where
they can least be absorbed -- units within the economic means
affordable to low- and moderate-income people.
Federal Government Retreat
While these trends have been developing, the federal
government has become entrenched in its "fiscal federalism",
leading to drastic cuts in support of housing in a number of
areas. Assistance to low- and moderate-income tenants and the
number of these tenants eligible to receive housing aid has
been cut. Support for the construction of new housing by the
private sector has also been cutback, as have government
expenditures for the production and rehabilitation of public
housing funds for low- and moderate-income homeownership
opportunities. In addition, the government reduced tax
incentives to the private sector for the production of rental
housing through the 1986 Tax Reform Act, and decreased federal
loans to low-income and moderate-income homeowners for the
rehabilitation of substandard units.
"
3William Apgar, The State of the Nation's Housing, 1990
(Cambridge, MA: Joint Center for Housing Studies, 1990) p. 2-7.
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At the same time that the federal government has reduced
its commitment to affordable housing construction, it has
deregulated the mortgage industry, leading to the savings and
loan scandal, and increased the indirect housing subsidies to
the wealthy. The savings and loan crisis has limited access
to capital and without access to capital, it is impossible to
provide shelter to the new households that will form in the
1990s, regardless of income. What is most ironic about the
governments policy is that the one form of assistance it
failed to cut was the large subsidy that goes to the middle
class through tax deductions to homeowners for property tax
and mortgage interest from their income taxes. In 1987, the
subsidy amounted to $35.1 billion, according to the
Congressional Budget Office. This is four times larger than
HUD's budget for low income housing. 4
The shortage of housing affordable to people with low-
incomes has reached crisis proportions. Essentially, more
poor people, who have less money, are now seeking fewer and
fewer available apartments, of declining quality, at sharply
increasing rents.'5 As this has occurred, homeownership rates
have declined as well, leaving many people, regardless of
'
4Peter Drier and John Atlas "Grassroots Strategies for the
Housing Crisis: A National Agenda," Social Policy (Winter
1989) p. 29.
5Nancy Andrews, The Challenge of Affordable Housing: A
Perspective for the 1980s. (New York: Ford Foundation, 1986)
pgs. 3-13.
their income, pressed to find housing that suits their needs
and pocketbooks.
Boston Housing Environment
The housing environment in Boston is indicative of the
environment faced by the rest of the nation. Since World War
II, residential and real estate prices have almost always
appreciated until very recently where we are now seeing
glimpses of a significant downward adjustment in housing
prices throughout the Commonwealth. According to the Real
Estate Department of Coopers & Lybrand, the recent reduction
in home prices has been caused by both a speculative
oversupply of housing stock for the middle-income market, and
a generally weakened economy. Many developers in the region
are unable to make debt service payments on their buildings
and as such, are turning them over to banks who are selling or
auctioning them at reduced prices. 16 The banks in the region
have also been hit hard due to portfolios filled with non-
performing real estate loans. In return, they have tightened
their underwriting standards decreasing the availability of
loans.
While declining real estate markets might seem a boon for
low-income families, the recession coupled with restrictive
16John H. Cushman, "The Fed Strategy to Ease Credit," The
New York Times, February 27, 1991. p. D1.
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lending requirements and the large production decrease in
multi-family housing cuts against any large improvements. The
simple fact is that most low-income people, who are renters,
cannot afford to purchase a home. Even with higher payment-
to-income ratios "the cost associated with purchasing and
owning a home are too high for the level of income of the
majority of the Commonwealth's renter households" who earn a
median income between $22,000 and $24,000, and in Boston form
$18,000 to $20,000."7
Some public and private homeownership programs provide
downpayment assistance as well as relaxed underwriting
criteria to help first-time homebuyers. But, homeownership is
out of reach for most renters/low-income people without deep
subsidies. Moreover, "these programs target households with
incomes between $22,000 and $36,000", yet, "the majority of
renter families have incomes below these thresholds."18
Simply put, prices have not fallen enough for low-income
people to purchase homes.
The impacts of the housing situation does not only effect
housing opportunities for low-income people, it extends to
decisions made by the business sector. Throughout Boston,
employers are finding it increasingly difficult to attract and
retain a low-income/service sector workforce in localities
17Executive Office of Communities and Development.
Massachusetts Housing Report. (Boston, MA: Executive Office of
Communities and Development, October 1990). p. 4.
"Ibid. p. 6.
where housing costs and incomes are out of line. Some
companies have attempted to reverse this trend, but for the
most part, efforts have only assisted management, while doing
little to increase lower level employees' capacity to afford
housing, either for ownership or rental.
If a solution to this trend is not actively sought,
substantial and harmful cost will be imposed upon employers.
In Boston, where housing cost are among the highest in the
nation, service positions have become vacant. For example, 90
percent of hospitals recruiting nurses and 80 percent of firms
hiring clerical workers reported labor shortages according to
a 1987 study published by the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
Other likely outgrowths of housing affordability include loss
of key personnel to lower housing cost areas, demand for
higher wages, diminished productivity and unacceptable
recruitment and retention of employees.
Housing affordability issues are also particularly
germane for particular employer types. For example, many
local governments rely on low-wage employees to provide
essential services; these same workers, however, are typically
the victims of the affordable housing shortage, particularly
in jurisdictions that have residency requirements. Without
cities assuming some of the burden for addressing housing
needs, employees experience difficulty in fulfilling this
requirement.19 More interesting perhaps is that young
upwardly mobile job seekers will increasingly accept
employment in an affordable housing market where they can
attain their envisioned lifestyle with such a condition
hurting companies ability to remain competitive in the
marketplace.
Employers are not the only ones who stand to lose in high
cost housing markets. Employees who are essentially precluded
from entering the housing market must either relocate to other
areas or settle for sub-optimal housing arrangements. This
scenario breeds a duality in which employees commute long
distances to locate affordable housing or live in nearby
housing that is overcrowded or otherwise substandard.
Inevitably, a decline in worker productivity and labor
shortages at various skill levels decreases the economic
vitality of the region. Business becomes less competitive and
thus relocates. This in turn erodes the region's tax base and
further drains economic growth and development. Ultimately,
housing prices will return to affordable levels, but not
before the region has paid a high price.
As employers have become more cognizant of the housing
affordability issue, new and innovative approaches at
attacking this problem have been produced. However, few have
attempted to confront the service sector/low-income employee's
19Myron P. Curzan and Amanda Carney. "Lack of Affordable
Housing Spurs Employer-Supported Housing Programs," Urban Land.
(July 1989) p. 6.
housing dilemma in a meaningful way. Fortunately, a direct
attempt at altering this course of action, has occurred in
Boston through the efforts of the employer-assisted housing
trust fund established by Boston's Hotel and Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 26.
CHAPTER 1
A Historical View: The Progressive Roots Behind
The Housing Trust Fund
The colorful past of Local 26 and that of the
International Hotel and Restaurant Employees' Union (HERE)
provides a good example of the development a union, like other
organizations, goes through, before arriving at maturity. The
history of this maturity and the union's responses to
obstacles provides insight into the progressive and innovative
trajectory that led to, especially in the last ten years, the
establishment of the "non-labor issue" employer-assisted
housing trust fund.
A cursory glance at the past 20 years and beyond to the
Union's inception in 1888, indicates that the HERE and the
locals have struggled with the same critical problems:
battles between craft and industrial unionism ; contempt for
organizing unskilled, often racial and ethnic minority
workers; and strike breaking tactics practiced by government
and management.
The Beginning: Craft vs. Industrial Unionism
Prior to 1888, the year in which both the International
and Boston's Local 77 were founded, restaurant and hotel
workers were at the mercy of the ebb and flow in the economic
cycle:
"When business dwindled, the restaurant and the hotel
workers were the first to feel it. In bad times
laborers from the mills and factories besieged the
restaurant for work at any pay."'
Upset with their tenuous condition, bartenders and waiters
joined the radical labor movement of the Noble Order of the
Knights of Labor. The Knight's mission was to combine into
one monolithic organization all of the nation's laborers.
However, they quickly dismantled in 1886, due to the trade
unionist movement that advocated organizing the skilled
workers into fairly narrow and separate craft unions.
The void left by the Knights was soon filled by an
organization calling itself the American Federation of Labor
(AFL). The AFL's ideology called for uniting forces on an
economic front and fighting for job control, improved working
conditions and job security.- This platform was well received
by the increasing number of unions forming nation-wide as a
result of the industrial expansion following the Civil War.
The AFL ideology was particularly attractive to hotel and
restaurant workers in Boston because of the unstable nature of
their profession. Under the direction of John Mee, Local 77
reduced working hours from 15 to 10 hours a day and increased
wages from $22 to $30 a month. News of these improved
'Matthew Josephson, Union House, Union Bar. (New York:
Random House, 1956) p. 5.
conditions traveled quickly as the AFL spot-lighted the
powerful organizing and visible union building tactics that
would characterize the local's history for decades to come.
As workers witnessed these improvements the ranks of the HERE
increased.
Early Conflict Between Skilled and Unskilled Workers
Despite this increase, the numbers of unionized
restaurant and hotel workers was still too small to provide
unions with effective leverage over management. Thus, the
HERE sought to remedy this by the common contemporary union
tactic of organizing the unorganized.
Although this sounded like a good way to strengthen the
union, it was met with vehement opposition by many members.
At this time, bartenders comprised sixty-six percent of all
union membership and were reluctant to let lower level,
"unskilled" workers enter their privileged union. 2 Thus, the
AFL divided workers according to craft. Yet, division by
craft led to division between the skilled and the unskilled.
This encouraged the establishment of labor aristocrats, while
neglecting the categories of workers who were poor and
unskilled; these often being those belonging to minority
racial groups.
2Telephone interview with Don Byers of the International
Union on February 4, 1991.
The Industrial Union Movement
The first marked dissension among the union ranks
surfaced here with waiters acting contrary to bartenders by
supporting the unionization of dishwashers, bus boys and house
maids -- the unskilled. Waiters pressed for unionizing these
workers because they filled their jobs when employee walk-outs
were staged. Positioning themselves as such signaled the
beginning of the gradual move that the lines of craft
organization, which restricts membership into the union
according to a specific skill, must give way to a broader form
of "industrial unionism in which a given industry will strike
as a whole and in which one part of organized labor will not
be in the position to aid the employers of another group of
strikers."3 Taking this cue, the HERE made a slight movement,
in theory, from craft unionism to industrial unionism.4 In
practice however, the leadership of the HERE dragged its feet
and decided against vigorously organizing "back of the house"
workers or the unskilled lest they upset the powerful
bartenders.
This disorganization was exacerbated by the temperance
movement as the union witnessed a drop in its membership--
3Matthew Josephson, Union House, Union Bar. (New York:
Random House, 1956) p. 115.
4Marten Estey, The Unions: Structure, Development and
Management. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.,
1976) p. 24.
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Boston's Local 77 membership decreased from 2,800 to 900
during this period. The traditional bar room was replaced
with self-service cafeterias that employed many workers. This
opened up new field of conquest for the union. However, as
the union tried to "take up the work of organizing soft-drink
dispensers and soda fountain employees (the unskilled)..." it
was met head on with extreme hostility from workers.
Reflecting craft pride, many workers protested against
organizing the self-service cafeteria workers, viewing them as
the root cause of their deteriorating livelihood.
Early Management Attacks on Labor
As Prohibition gained momentum the HERE's weak foothold
in organizing workers was further exacerbated by the
confluence of many social and economic forces, the most
serious of which was the Depression of 1929. This condition
syurred management to invoke some its most infamous union
busting tactics, such as wage cutting, employer controlled
unions, "yellow dog" contracts, encouragement of racial and
ethnic separatism and dissension among workers and "red-
baiting" of local and HERE leadership.
Where management, during the World War I labor scarcity,
had been disposed to sit at the table with labor, it now, with
the depression, instituted wage cuts timed with a powerful
29
'Ibid. p. 145.
campaign against legitimate trade-unionism and worker
desperation for employment. But, instead of appearing to deny
workers all rights to organization and benefits, efforts were
made to supplant the workers own unions with employer-
controlled company unions.
Union Response to Management Attacks
The restaurant industry immediately felt the impact of
these tactics as hotels began to lower wages and stretch their
help. In response, the HERE and Local 77 planted the seeds
for organizing labor across all lines to counter balance these
management policies.
At this time, Local 77 had been one of the bulwarks in
the International. The leadership, like other locals, had
increased pay scales, established a good relationship with
management providing for "union shop" (which makes union
membership a condition of employment) and improved the working
conditions of its workers. However, prior to the renewal of
the current contract between the Local 77 and Boston's hotels,
management indicated that they wanted employees to sign
individual contracts or lose their jobs. These contracts,
better known as "yellow dog" contracts, were a legal device
though which a worker, in return for a job, agreed not to join
a union with the rationale being to take advantage of those
workers desperate for employment so that they leave the union
and negotiate individually with employers.
Combating this management trajectory was not only
important to Local 77, it was tantamount to survival for all
HERE locals. After all, if the Boston local, or any union for
that matter, was eliminated through these attacks, the same
methods would be replicated and used against all labor unions.
As news of the development spread to the HERE, a large
offensive was established by Local 77 to halt this anti-union
trend with the Local soliciting the assistance of other unions
and the AFL.6 This organizing spurred uninhibited financial
support from the AFL and a pledge honoring the picket line
from all unions that serviced the Boston hotels.
To further augment Local 77's fight, the HERE and other
unions applied federal political pressure to management. In
Congress, the Norris-Laguardia bill, which besides restricting
the use of labor injunctions, incorporated a clause banning
the "yellow dog" contract as discriminatory. Although no
union shop conditions were granted, this struggle made the
Local resilient to management attacks and brought to the fore
the resourcefulness and organizing that has come to
characterize the tactics that are necessary to persevere and
endure in labor struggles today.
6Telephone Interview with HERE historian, Don Byers,
February 4, 1991.
As this attack subsided, management instigated other
anti-union tactics. By 1932, the composition of the union had
changed perceptibly. The HERE was no longer solely comprised
of bartenders, but of cooks, waiters and other culinary
workers. With this trend came a change in the racial and
ethnic composition of the union membership. As racial and
ethnic diversity increased suspicion among the different
nationalities was promoted by management. For example, when
cooks tried to organize a union or better their conditions,
management would replace them with a crew of another race,
pitting one ethnicity or race against the other and thereby
deteriorating unity and cohesion within the union.7
During this Depression period, local unions were painted
"red" by management in an attempt to discredit and weaken
them. Where the labor movement had not done its job well,
where it had ignored large masses of the unorganized, these
workers, out of desperation flocked to the Communist Party and
other radical unions who envisioned a utopian state of social
justice. This fueled the contention of management that labor
in this country was subversive and anti-American. This
situation became so severe that the HERE abandoned its free
association doctrine through the following amendment:
"No member holding office in any dual association,
or society that in any way whatsoever seeks to engage
in similar functions as our local unions... shall be
7Matthew Josephson, Union House, Union Bar. (New York:
Random House, 1956) p. 41.
eligible for six months thereafter to hold office
within our local unions.",8
By eradicating the existence of dual organizations that
practiced similar functions, the HERE effectively barred
communist and other radical members from seeking membership,
thereby moderating attacks on the union's allegiance to the
U.S.
As the Depression hit bottom, the then president of the
International, Ed Flore, made a visionary request, similar to
the present day union affordable housing movement, for a
labor-government partnership to ease the country's economic
woes. Specifically, he called for large public expenditures
on public works, especially in housing, to spur economic
activity.
The HERE soon benefitted from this policy timed with the
elimination of the final vestiges of the temperance movement.
The president of the Boston local, John Kearney, a member of
>he Massachusetts Legislaturie, lobbied with other politicians
and union local presidents across the country for the early
repeal of the Volstead Act enforcing the Eighteenth Amendment.
In 1933 Prohibition was abolished, putting more union members
back to work.
Despite this good fortune, unionization of the labor
force was still decreasing. In the past, the federal
government would not have concerned itself with such a union
'Ibid., p. 176.
problem. But now, through the union movement, most government
officials were convinced that strong unions could spur
national economic recovery.
With President Roosevelt supporting and actively
advocating unionization under the New Deal unions prospered.
The outgrowth of this complementary relationship was that for
the first time, the federal government guaranteed workers the
right to organize and join unions. If a majority of workers
wanted to unionize, their employer, through the Wagner Act,
was legally compelled to bargain with them. Moreover, the
National Industrial Recovery Act pleased both sides by
allowing management to control production and raise prices,
while promising labor the right to put a floor under wages and
reduce hours worked per day.
Craft vs. Industrial Unionism Revisited
The result of these federal pro-labor policies was an
organizing frenzy of all workers -- skilled, unskilled and
even unorganized workers. The HERE leadership quickly
realized that purely craft union methods were not well adapted
to successful organizing in the hotel and restaurant trade in
which so many unskilled or semi-skilled people constantly
reduce the status of the trained craftsmen. Yet, the AFL held
to this conservative past and stuck to the craft union route.
As a result, a critical mass-of dissidents formed.
Mounting support of industrial unionism was championed under
the belief that only when all the workers, skilled and
unskilled, came together in a large union could labor deal
with the giant corporation. The craft unionist in an attempt
to appease white, skilled workers, not only overlooked the
unskilled workers, as they would for the next 50 years, they
excluded the racial minorities and recent immigrants that made
up the back bone of the industry.
Union Response: Mass Organizing
These practical and ideological differences were the main
impetus behind the formation of the Committee on Industrial
Organization (CIO) in 1935. The basic philosophy of the CIO
was "to encourage the organization of the unorganized workers
in mass production industries on an industrial basis. " This
approach met with great success as large numbers of semi-
skilled and unskilled workers joined the industrial unions.
Essentially, the CIO succeeded where the AFL had failed --
organizing the unorganized.
Instead of continuing as an old fashioned craft union and
limiting itself mainly to better paid bartenders and crafts
persons in the trade, the HERE adopted the methods of the
9Marten Estey, The Unions: Structure, Development and
Management. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc.,
1976) p. 24.
industrial unions and began to marshal the masses of semi-
skilled or unskilled workers in the hotels and large self-
service food factories. Thus, the HERE, as before, had taken
the cue of the mounting industrial union movement to heart,
and although in theory they clung to the notion of craft
unionism, they emulated the CIO by organizing according to
industrial lines. 10
Government Attacks and Union Response
As the nation crawled out of the Great Depression by the
end of the 1930s, traditional union organizing and management
pressure tactics were altered by the U.S. involvement in World
War II. The federal government reversed its support of labor
and brought powerful pressure "to bear on all unions to the
end that stoppages of production might be banned by voluntary
no strike pledges."" The War Labor Board, armed with full
wartime powers, prohibited all strikes and instituted wage and
price controls, bringing about a change in union bargaining
tactics.
As the war came to a close in 1946, and the nation re-
tooled itself, economic expansion set in. Many locals moved
to improve their conditions through a process of mass
10Matthew Josephson, Union House, Union Bar. (New York:
Random House, 1956) p. 285
"Ibid., p. 293.
organizing and calculated strikes, Management acquiesced to
labor's threats so as to benefit from the fruits of this
economic expansion. For the majority of union membership,
this trend followed a reduction in daily hours worked, the
introduction of health and welfare benefits and an increase in
take home pay. This was a prosperous time for the HERE, as
membership doubled and the establishment of educational
apprenticeship programs improved and strengthened leadership's
accountability to workers.
But, just as quickly as the locals witnessed an increase
in power and membership, anti-union legislation gained
support, culminating with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act
in 1947. This legislation, which safeguarded the interest of
employers, put the locals in the familiar position of having
to defend themselves against anti-union forces. The primary
mechanisms by which to do this were through the well-worn
tactics of increasing membership and centralizing leadership.
Throughout this period (1950s and 1960s), the
International perused an arduous and unremitting organizing
effort with the object of bolstering their political clout so
as to repeal or alter pro-management legislation. As attacks
on all segments of labor increased, the HERE and the AFL
realized that it was in their best interest to merge with the
growing CIO. This agreement was consummated in 1955.
The HERE also reorganized the structure of its
leadership, providing the president with the added power of
disciplining or regulating the affairs of local unions, "not
only in cases of subversive activities, but in all other
instances of proved malpractice."" This allowed the
president to better direct the HERE organizing staff and to
move promptly to affect local union actions, especially
strikes.
A New Historical Path: Local 26 and President Buzzotto
In 1973, change started percolating from the bottom of
the Boston craft unions to the top. A member of the Local 34,
Dominic Buzzotto, who had been much inspired by his
involvement with Dr. Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights
Movement, advocated for the merger of all three of the Boston
craft locals in partial response to the 1964 Civil Rights Act
outlawing separate unions for women and men." This
amalgamation was instituted to help pool the economic power of
the hotel and restaurant workers, unskilled and skilled alike,
and, as in the past, to organize workers into one solid
phalanx."
12Ibid. p. 335.
"Local 26 was formed from the merger of Local 277, Hotel
Catering and Waitresses Union; Local 34, Bartenders and Dining
Room Employees' Union and Local 186, Cooks and Culinary Workers
Union.
14Betsy Aron, Mobilizing Strategies in Times of Transition,
Local 26: A Case Study of Participation and Power. Unpublished
Paper, Department of Political Science, Bradeis University,
1990. p. 12.
Although much of the previous history of the Local and
the International had grudgingly recognized the importance of
organizing the lower-income, unskilled workers, the
experiences of the 1960s had accomplished little toward
bringing these people into the union ranks. Representation in
decision making only reflected the concerns of bartenders,
cooks and other high wage earners and effectively overlooked
disenfranchised and unskilled union members. According to the
current president of Local 26, Dominic Buzzotto, "the back of
the house workers were union members with no voice, no
representation at this time. They never knew the benefits of
unionism and therefore their participation and membership into
the union wasn't fully realized."15
In 1979, a fire at the Shearaton Hotel restaurant
provided the impetus for the movement away from traditional
union leadership. With the burning down of the hotel and the
loss of jobs that occasioned it, Dominic Buzzotto, learned a
valuable lesson about the working and living conditions of
other union members and leadership's irresponsiveness to their
problems. Left without a job, Buzzotto went to Local 26 to
help him find new employment. When both union leadership and
hotel management refused to respond, Buzzotto resolved that he
'Interview with Dominic Buzzotto. February 4, 1991.
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would seek the union presidency by making the administration
more accountable to all workers.16
Buzzotto's Rise to the Top: A Change
As Buzzotto visited numerous hotels to garner support for
his campaign, he noticed that not much had changed since the
late 1960s:
"As I visited the hotels, one thing stood out.
If you were a waiter or a bartender, positions
held by whitesyou received free meals and ate
in the employee cafeteria. If you were
stewarding or house keeping, minority jobs, you
paid for your meals and ate in the back
stairwell. ""
In response, Buzzotto decided that in order to make the union
responsive and accountable to all members, he would institute
a "rank and file movement" and organize the "back of the
house" workers, as had been advocated under the early
industrial union movement, to capture and change the
leadership of Local 26.
Buzzotto did this through a three year grass-roots
campaign of visiting workers at their homes, neighborhoods and
churches, as opposed to only at work, and reiterating to them
that the union could work for them with their involvement and
support for him.
16Caitlin Deinard, Contract Negotiations at Local 26 (A) .
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, Case no. 9-490-062,
1990) p. 4.
17Interview with Dominic Buzzotto. February 6, 1991.
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Throughout his campaign, Buzzotto highlighted the
inequities that existed between the "front of the house
workers" (waiters, bellmen) who earned high wages and
gratuities and the "back of the house" workers (dishwasher,
maids etc.) who were underpaid workers of color.'" He
promised to restructure the Union to end such injustices. The
slate he chose, calling itself HELP( Hotel Employees for
Leadership and Pride) reflected this goal, as it included
people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds and
various job classifications. This multi-cultural, multi-
vocational slate was a departure from past Local 26 campaigns.
Under the previous leadership, led by president "Hotel Joe"
Sullivan, slates were comprised of front of the house workers
who were the only active and voting members of the Union.
After being elected president in 1981, Buzzotto strayed
from past labor practices and continued to encourage the
involvement of the predominantly minority, back of the house
workers. According to Buzzotto, they did this through the
non-traditional approach of internal organizing. That is,
they strengthened the union by informing and encouraging
members to use their benefits. They spoke not only of
increasing wages, but of improving members lives through
increased benefits and member involvement in the union's
operation. This was drastic departure from other unions who
18Local 26 Organizing Memorandum, The Hotel as a Plantation,
1986, p. 1.
emphasized simply increasing wages and membership, while
neglecting to inform membership about how the union could work
on their behalf.19 As the members became more cognizant of
their voices, they became less apathetic and more involved in
union administration, policies and benefits structure.
This had a great impact on the future progressive
trajectory of the union membership. In a collectively made
policy decision, Buzzotto, prior to contract negotiations, was
required to have the membership polled to find out their needs
and concerns. This focused union energies as "each year an
issue was targeted for the negotiation, which then became a
rallying cry for the union."20
Planting Seeds for a Housing Trust Fund
As a result of this issue-targeting process, Local 26
demanded a dental trust fund in 1982. In the contract
negotiations, the hotels agreed to pay five cents per hour
worked by every employee into a dental trust fund. The money
collected was used to establish a dental service for workers
and their families. Any individual sponsored by a union
member could also receive the dental services at a reduced
19 nterview with Dominic Buzzotto. February 6, 1991.
2 0Caitlin Deinard, Contract Negotiations at Local 26 (A)-.
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School, Case no. 9-490-062,
1990) p. 6
cost from the union dentist.21 Th-is process heightened
members' awareness that they indeed did have a voice in union
policies.
In 1985, the new call was for a legal services fund,
which provided for a contribution of five cents per hour
worked into a legal trust fund. Through this program, union
members and their families receive representation and legal
advice in areas such as immigration, real estate, contracts
and credit problems. According to Buzzotto, the negotiating
team included 65 members in 1985, with the transcripts of the
meeting translated into many different languages so as to
notify and include as many members as possible in union
negotiation and operations.
Creating this responsive mood provided members with a
sense that they had control over their union. As a result, in
1988, the union went one step further and began the process of
instituting what many termed a "non-labor" issue. With the
active use of the legal services trust fund, Local 26
leadership discovered that many union members' legal disputes
were connected with their housing. Workers were paying high
rents and receiving substandard accommodations and as a
result, taking their landlords to court with other local
residents.
Many of the low wage employees lamented over the dearth
of affordable and satisfactory housing and pressed Buzzotto to
2
'Local 25 Dental Program Brochure
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take action. Predictably however, the issue received much lip
service by other labor unions and little substantive action.
Yet, Local 26 was set to provide a more definitive remedy to
this problem.
Subsequent to the legal dispute discovery, Local 26
queried its membership concerning issues to raise in the 1988
contract negotiations. Not surprisingly, housing
affordability and satisfaction emerged as the most serious
concern.
The Battle for a Housing Trust Fund
Having asserted itself as one of the most progressive
unions in the U.S., Local 26 was prepared to forge new ground.
In late 1988, union members overwhelmingly agreed to strike on
the heels of the National League of Cities Conference at a
Boston hotel if the hotel owners did not accept a proposal
that provided for the creatibon of a jointly run housing trust
fund. The hotel owners acceptance came, albeit grudgingly.
To create local support for the Trust, the union
instigated a highly professional campaign that portrayed the
hotel industry as a thriving, highly profitable industry
readily able to meet the legitimate demands of the workers.
They also accused the hotel industry of being at the root of
the affordable housing crisis:
"While workers are unable to find adequate housing,
the hotel owners develop and finance commercial and
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luxury housing projects that-exacerbate the housing
crisis. "22
More importantly, the union broadened the struggle beyond the
typical labor-management issue into a community issue for
justice. By documenting hotel management lifestyles (in one
case a hotel manager's garage was appraised at $37,000!) and
rattling off unbelievable statistics of hotel investment
potential in affordable housing, this struggle was transformed
into a basic battle for justice.
However, the issue of creating a housing trust fund
brought its problems. The first issue the union had to
grapple with was how to design the Trust. And, given that,
how to implement it.
Local 26 had three designs for the funding and operation
of the Trust. The first was to raise union dues and apply
this raise to a trust for housing. The second was to seek a
wage increase and subtract a portion of this for the Trust.
Neither of these approaches required a change of the Taft-
Hartley Act because management was not involved. But the
union wanted management involvement because, according to
Buzzotto:
"By involving management, we forced them into the Taft-
Hartley Act, and made both management and the Local
responsible to oversee it... companies like Shearaton and
Hilton would make sure the Trust was run correctly
because it was federally mandated and their reputation
was on the line. The union brought the idea and
management brought the expertise to make it work so
22Local 26, "Part I: Who Benefits from Boston's Housing
Crisis?, 1986, p. 2.
they wouldn't be embarrassed,""
Moreover, this approach fit well with the Local 26 ideology
that benefits are more important than wages. As noted by
President Buzzotto "five cents more in wages isn't going to
buy you anything, but if you pool that, you can get a lot."
Even with the joint-trust established, the contract was
still illegal according to labor law, but Local 26 felt they
could change this. Prior to Local 26's housing trust fund,
collective-bargaining agreements could only provide for
jointly managed benefits specifically named in the Taft-
Hartley Act, of which housing was not included. The Taft-
Hartley banned most joint use of employer funds by unions and
management in order to prevent collusion and corruption that
could arise from such arrangements.24 For the Local 26
contract to be executed in accordance with the Taft-Hartley,
it had to be amended to include housing benefits. As a result
the Union took upon the monumental task of changing the Taft-
Hartley Act.
23Interview with Dominic Buzzotto, February 6, 1991.
24This important to the HERE given that they have been
routinely investigated for organized crime affiliations.
25Allan R. Gold, Boston Hotel Workers Gain a Housing Trust
Fund. (New York Times, December 4, 1988)p. kl.
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The Politics Behind the Housing Trust Fund
In September of 1989 over two-hundred members of Local 26
canvassed Capitol Hill lobbying Senators and Congresspeople,
much as Local 77 did under the Norris Laguardia bill, to
permit unions and employers to establish, pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement, a housing trust fund.
According to Dominic Buzzotto, ". .. members could have lost
their jobs and the union gone bankrupt, but they felt
affordable housing for workers would have broad political
support."
The union engaged in this effort without AFL-CIO support.
According to Buzzotto "the AFL-CIO felt that by opening up
Taft-Hartley the anti-union forces in Congress could weaken
other unions. In fact, the AFL-CIO right up to the
negotiation opposed it because they insisted it was a non-
labor issue."
But, Local 26 defiantly pressed on. While on Capitol
Hill, the union members linked with other craft unions, as
they did during the depression, and popularized their struggle
as a fight for the "little guy". This issue was appealing to
both political parties. On the one had, it allowed Democrats
to continue their fight for the poor and oppressed. And on
the other, it satisfied the Republican concern for less
government and more private sector initiative in curing the
housing crisis.
In the end, the legislation was sponsored by Senators Ted
Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Orin Hatch (R-Utah) with the bill being
unanimously passed by the Senate on November 22, 1989. The
bill also received approval from the House and the U.S.
Department of Labor, who under the Reagan administration
consistently opposed innovative uses of union pension funds.
Eventually, the bill was signed into law by President Bush on
April 18, 1990, capping one of the most dramatic union
struggles in recent history and reinforcing the locals
departure from traditional union benefits.
Conclusion
The vigorous fight for the HTF has catapulted the union
into a new arena in which it must design an effective housing
program that will meet the diverse housing needs of its
generally low-income membership. Such a mission rekindles two
themes that have characterized the Local's past. First, in an
effort to break from past traditional union practices, the
union has proposed a redefinition of union involvement in
housing development. Their program does not provide jobs for
their members nor does financing rely on union pension funds.
Instead, the union wants to take a new stance and involve the
employer, through an employer-contributed housing trust fund
that will be used to write down mortgage interest rates,
provide downpayment assistance and much more. However,
providing housing assistance to a-li union members through the
HTF resuscitates the well-worn struggle concerning who has
rights to such a benefit -- the predominantly white, more
well-to-do skilled workers or the lower income, often minority
workers. This is a real allocative dilemma given that
assistance cannot be provided to all even though everyone must
contribute and benefit from this fund.
Chapter 2
UNAC Housing Program: Balancing
the Needs of All Members
The obstacles Local 26 has confronted in the past have
not dissipated. Members, especially "back of the house"
workers, still earn deplorably low wages while serving as the
back bone of the hotel industry. Management continues to
recruit recent immigrants while offering them non-competitive
wages. And, the federal government actively supports anti-
union laws that work against any innovative use of union
pension fund investment in affordable housing. The end result
of such tactics is that housing is placed further beyond the
reach of hotel workers. In response, the union has combated
this unfriendly climate through its successful efforts in
having the Housing Trust Fund (HTF) incorporated into U.S.
labor law. Now, the task for Local 26, after having created
this new resource, is to use it in a way that best meets
members' housing needs. Now that Local 26 has created this
resource, it must use it in a way that best meets its
membership's housing needs.
Toward this effort, this chapter will outline the route
that the union has taken thus far in meeting its membership's
housing needs. First, the chapter will provide an overview of
the housing situation facing many Local 26 members. It will
then go on to outline the union's responses to members'
housing conditions through the UNAC housing program, while
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paying particular attention to the separate distributional
concerns that accompany any allocation of this scarce
resource. After that, the chapter will highlight some of the
housing program shortcomings concerning the present
distributive policy and offer some suggestions for curing
these distributive dilemmas, while noting that meeting the
demands and interest of all UNAC members is not feasible.
Determining how to satisfy all the concerns of the
membership necessitates an understanding of the union members'
housing needs. Central to this concern is the following
question: What housing problems are union members
confronting? In 1988, the union set out to answer this exact
question through a housing survey.
The Housing Survey
The responses to the survey are indicative of the housing
environment confronted by many Boston residents as
corroborated by the Local 26 Housing Needs Assessment Survey.'
Under this study, which is continually updated, questionnaires
concerning workers' housing conditions were mailed to all
Local 26 members covered by contract with major hotels (i.e.
60% of membership). A preponderance of the responses came
from low-income workers (undoubtedly because they have the
'According to a 1988 study done by Abt Associates, renters in
Boston pay 50 to 55 percent of their income toward rent and
utilities.
most severe housing problems), with an overall response rate
of 7.94%.2 It was acknowledged in the report that this was
not a representative or random sample. However, the report
stated that, " the survey should not be seen as representing
all unionized hotel workers... it is, however, reflective of
the lower-paid workers who live close to the central city, and
who make up about two thirds of all unionized hotel workers."3
According to the survey, approximately three quarters of
all respondents had some type of problem with their housing
situation, the most common of which were substandard apartment
amenities, exorbitant rents and overcrowding. Thirty one
percent of respondents noted that there were more than two
people per bedroom in their apartment, while 11 percent had
more than three people per bedroom. Other problems faced by
union members included imminent displacement due to
condominium conversion or eviction (10%), crime and drugs in
neighborhood and heating problems.
The income characteristics for multiple wage earning
households, provided a slightly rosier picture, but are far
less promising than the present median income for Boston
residents. The median family income of respondents was
$22,000. As one would expect, union members' household
incomes varied according to how many wage earners were present
2Surveys were sent to the 3,200 members covered under the
hotel contract with 254 members responding.
3Local 26 Housing Needs Assessment, June 1988, p. 3.
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in the household -- 42 percent had one earner, 33 percent had
two earners and 25 percent had 3 or more wage earners. Given
this breakdown, the overall average income was $24,700, while
for single-wage earning households, the mean income was only
$16,800.'
More disturbing is that approximately half the
respondents had no savings that they could apply to a
downpayment or a security deposit for a home or apartment. Of
the respondents with savings, the median amount saved was
$5,000, with roughly a third reporting $7,000 or more in
savings.
Despite the low incomes of many of the respondents (see
table 1) few receive any federal or state housing subsidy or
live in public housing (8%).
Table 1
Household Incomes for UNAC Members
Less than $10,000 3%
$10,000 - $19,999 36%
$20,000 $29,999 33%
$30,000 - $39,999 17%
$40,000 - $49,999 7%
$50,000 or more 5%
However, many are eligible for public assistance, but
according to the study, few know how to apply or have lost
interest in trying to secure housing assistance through the
public sector. In fact, 78 percent of the respondents'
4According to Betsy Aron who worked for the Union for the past
three years and Bruce Marks, Executive Director of UNAC, these
income figures still hold today due to small increases in wages.
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families are eligible for section-8 assistance, and 50 percent
qualify as "very low income" (i.e. have income below 50 of the
area median income) and therefore are eligible for Boston
public housing.
It is clear that much of the city's housing stock is beyond
the grasp of many union members. This is aptly illustrated by
the fact that if rent was to remain at 25 percent of income,
more than 75 percent of union members who answered the survey
would not be able to meet the rent on a typical two bedroom
market rate apartment renting at $825 a month.
Given these survey results, it is apparent that the housing
needs of the union membership span a multitude of conditions.
While many workers are experiencing difficulties with their
housing situation, some families have sufficient income to
purchase a subsidized home, and still others are just beyond
homelessness. With regard to home owning and renting, most
workers find themselves in four difficult financial
situations. First, they have enough income to support a
mortgage, but not enough savings to cover downpayment and
closing cost. Second, they have sufficient savings, but lack
the income to cover the monthly debt service on a mortgage.
Third, their financial condition and credit histories do not
conform to the current conservative banking industry
underwriting standards. Or fourth, they lack the financial
resources to come up with first and last months rent and a
security deposit.
Union Response To Workers' Housing Conditions
The union has begun to respond to the four issues listed above
through the establishment of a legally and organizationally
separate non-profit housing arm called the Union Neighborhood
Assistance Corporation (UNAC). Although in its early stages,
UNAC has already designed two programs to combat the housing
crisis. First, through the Housing Development Program (HDP),
which has yet to get off the ground, diverse financial
resources such as International and Local 26 union pension
funds and public and private resources will be pooled to
finance and construct new units of affordable housing for
Local 26 and community members. These units will be developed
through joint ventures with neighborhood-based community
development corporations and private developers in exchange
for worker set-asides. Second, the Housing Assistance,
Counseling and Credit Service (ACCESS), which has been
operating successfully for over a year, especially in
enrolling income-eligible members for section 8 and public
housing, provides a vast array of counseling and referral
services to hotel workers and community residents trying to
buy or rent affordable housing units, with financial
assistance provided to union members through the soon to be
operative employer-contributed Housing Trust Fund (HTF).5
Understanding the union membership's financial conditions,
'Local 26 Housing Program Proposal, 1988.
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particularly issues concerning income and savings, is a
crucial precursor to establishing a housing program. For
housing development projects done through HDP, members
financial conditions will determine the mix of ownership
options and housing and rent prices, in addition to the type
of public subsidies sought.
For ACCESS, the financial characteristics will determine
the type and quantity of technical and financial assistance
required. For example, people with low-incomes are likely to
need help in understanding the subsidized rental housing maze,
while higher income families may need assistance in locating
good lending institutions and understanding mortgage
underwriting criteria.
Preliminary UNAC Housing Program
After having taken all the members' financial
characteristics into account, plus recognizing the dearth of
federal and state housing resources, UNAC has responded with a
skeletal six-part housing program for the employer-contributed
HTF that will potentially be used as the national model for
the provision of decent affordable housing assistance for
service workers. In designing the program, which will be
outlined in the following section, the union looked to the
four common financial situations of workers noted earlier,
while keeping an eye on the low-income nature of the
membership. Given this, they then tried to satisfy these
conditions through the following mechanisms: rental
guarantee; lease-up guarantee; downpayment assistance;
mortgage buydown assistance; non-conforming loans and
rehabilitation assistance.
Table 2
Overview of UNAC Housing Program
Rental Assures payment of the members first and last
Assistance months' rent plus security deposit through
the HTF on an appropriate apartment.
Guaranteed UNAC provides a limited-guarantee for lease-
Lease-Up up on apartments for three years in exchange
members receive below market rents.
Downpayment Member required to make monthly contributions
Assistance into an interest-bearing bank account through
automatic payroll deductions which are
augmented by HTF monies. Maximum loan amount
$5,000.
Mortgage Buydown reduces the interest rate 300 basis
Interest points in year 1 and 2, 200 basis points in
Rate Subsidy years 3 and 4, and 75 basis points for
remaining two years. Maximum amount loan
$7,500.
Non-Conforming HTF monies used to purchase PMI guaranteeing
Loans 20% of mortgage for people whose financial
condition does no conform to standard
underwriting criteria. Maximum loan amount,
$7,_500.
Rehabilitation Loans provided on units where at least $3,000
Loans of renovation is needed. Maximum loan
amount, $5,000.
Rental Assistance
The first form of assistance, aimed at lower-income
workers who do not have sufficient savings to rent a decent
affordable apartment, is the rental assistance guarantee
policy. This policy assures payment of the worker's first and
last months' rent plus security deposit through the HTF monies
on an appropriate apartment so that the participant does not
have to provide the money up front. The logistics of the
guarantee require a bank to service the HTF by establishing a
collective bank account to all landlords who rent to eligible
workers. The HTF does not supply actual dollars to the
landlord, but rather a legal certificate guaranteeing payment.
UNAC has grappled with a number of methods for
recapturing these funds in instances of employment termination
or refusal to pay. The first mechanism proposed to cure such
an ill was to have the termination date of the guarantee run
with the lease or yearly so that the HTF would not have to
continue guaranteeing the funds. Wanting to avoid any type of
legal proceedings, UNAC has also advocated establishing a lien
on any lump sum benefit paid at termination, namely pension
funds, to recoup losses. UNAC's latest discussion has members
making monthly deposits into a bank account that will
eventually equal the amount guaranteed, with payment
ultimately being provided to the landlord so the certificate
can be terminated.
Recognizing that landlords and tenants do not always
agree on the issues of damages to the apartment or sufficient
notice to leave, UNAC has called for a 30 day period in which
the landlord, in order to be repaid, can submit a claim
documenting such facts to the bank and UNAC. The bank
forwards the requested funds to the landlord after informing
UNAC. If the tenant indicates that the claim is invalid, he
or she has the right to contest the landlord in housing court.
If the court rules in the tenants favor, the member is
entitled to any additional damages awarded by the court, with
the member reimbursing the HTF irrespective of the court's
decision.
Guaranteed Lease-up
The declining real estate market in Boston, with its
falling rents and increasing vacancies, has led UNAC to adopt
a master lease program that complements the rental guarantee
policy. Under this program, UNAC provides a limited-guarantee
for lease-up on apartments for three years, while fully
guaranteeing the security deposit and one month's rent. In
return, union members receive below market rents on the union
set-aside housing units. If UNAC is unable to provide tenants
within one month of vacancy, HTF monies are used to cover the
next two months of rent so that the landlord can cover his or
her rental loss. Unlike the rental guarantee policy, this
program also covers the non-payment of rents for up to three
months.
Downpayment Assistance
Looking beyond rental situations with hopes of
increasing homeownership opportunities for its membership,
UNAC has drafted a downpayment assistance policy for those
members who have the requisite income, but do not have the
savings to meet downpayment and closing cost. This policy is
directed at resolving credit problems, having the participant
save money and providing education about the homebuying
process so that the participant can facilitate the purchase of
a home.
Under this policy, participants' are required to make
monthly contributions into an interest-bearing bank account at
an approved lending institution through automatic payroll or
checking account deductions. The required savings amount is
based upon a UNAC-assisted individual analysis of income and
family expenses, with the ultimate decision left to the
participant. The employer-contributed HTF monies are used to
supplement the money participants save. The size of the match
is based on a combination of need, which incorporates family
size, income and current housing expenses. Regardless of the
housing situation the maximum HTF contribution is $5,000 per
family.
After the participant enrolls in the program, he or she
is required to attend a series of private budget and
informational homebuying counseling sessions. A preponderance
of these sessions focus on how much participants can borrow
based on their current income, the necessary money and time it
will take toward meeting the closing cost and downpayment, the
range of home prices they can afford and the process of making
offers and executing a purchase and sales agreement.
As with any contract, breaches do occur. Thus, if the
participant does not save the agreed upon amount for two
months, the contract is void. Taking into account the
cyclical nature of the hotel industry, the contract will
remain intact for the first six months of a layoff, with no
participant or HTF contributions. In order to facilitate the
homebuying process, so that no unexpected obstacles arise,
UNAC will also periodically reverify employment and credit
information to ensure participants remain eligible for the
homes they originally set out to purchase. If a problem does
arise, UNAC will try to resolve it quickly so that the home
purchase plan can continue undisturbed.
Once the requisite amount is saved with HTF and personal
contributions, the participant receives a "diploma" certifying
that they have a certain amount of money for downpayment and
closing cost, and that they qualify for a particular mortgage.
UNAC staff then assist participants by educating them about
current home selling prices so that they can negotiate a
purchase price. Thereafter, the process of locating a home
begins with UNAC presenting this information to real estate
brokers and sellers.
Mortgage Interest Rate Subsidy
As was indicated in the housing survey, satisfying the
downpayment requirement is not the only problem participants
confront in purchasing a home. Rather, some have the
necessary savings, but lack the income to cover the monthly
mortgage debt service. As a result, UNAC has drafted an
interest buydown program in which the interest rate of an
already lower than market rate mortgage offered by a public
finance agency is written down further with HTF money. As the
buydown is tentatively structured, UNAC in conjunction with
the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) First Time
Homebuyer Mortgage Program, lowers the interest rate on below
market rate loans further for eligible participants for a six
year period with HTF monies. Similarly, UNAC has also
discussed the idea of negotiating a lower interest rate and
looser underwriting criteria with a private lending
institution in exchange for an exclusive with the large
customer pool of union members. In any case, the maximum
buydown may not exceed $7,500.
UNAC staff calculate how much the total interest buydown
cost based upon the actual mortgage amount. They then issue a
certificate which symbolizes that the HTF money has been
committed to the participant. Once the loan actually closes,
the total dollar amount needed for the buydown is transferred
from the HTF budget to the buydown account. Then, on a
monthly basis, as payments are made on the mortgage, the bank
transfers the HTF amount for each payment from this account.
The assumption behind such a program is that after the six
years is up, the individual's income will grow so that he or
she will be able to afford larger monthly debt service
payments.
Logistically, the buydown reduces the interest rate 300
basis points for the first two years, 200 basis points for
years 3 and 4 and 75 basis points for the remaining two years.
Thereafter, the mortgage increases to the actual rate.
As with downpayment assistance, UNAC staff review each
applicant's situation to determine if he or she is bankable
(i.e. stable employment, good credit, housing to income
expense and debt to income expense ratios acceptable to the
residential mortgage lending community) and needs the buydown
to purchase a home. After receiving a certificate symbolizing
these funds, the participant has roughly ninety days to locate
a house and execute a Purchase and Sales agreement (P&S).
During this time, the individual, while receiving assistance
on searching for a home, learns how to negotiate the P&S and
mortgage application process.
Non-Conforming Loans
The non-conforming loan policy is geared toward
participants whose financial situations do not conform to
standard mortgage underwriting criteria. This is important
because the standard underwriting criteria have a major impact
on the ability of a participant to purchase a home. These
guidelines, which are issued by the Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), are generally viewed as the
industry standard and are designed to ensure that the costs of
the mortgage appropriately relates to the borrower's ability
to pay. Presently, the Fannie Mae underwriting criteria
suggest that total monthly housing expenses cannot exceed 28
percent of gross monthly household income if the loan to value
ratio (LTV) is .90 or less. If, as is the case with many HTF
participants, the LTV is greater than .90 "total monthly
housing expenses cannot exceed 25% of gross monthly income
.... "6 This greatly decreases mortgage opportunities for many
union members.
In the hotel industry, it is quite common for workers to
have credit and payroll histories that do not adequately
reflect their ability to pay a mortgage. Thus, it is the aim
of this policy to assist these individuals. Through this
program, UNAC will use the HTF monies to purchase private
mortgage insurance (PMI), which is generally required on all
mortgages where the LTV is greater than .80. The PMI will
guarantee 20 percent of each loan against loss in instances of
6Denise DiPasquale, First-Time Homebuyers: Issues and Policy
Options. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Housing Policy Project, 1988) p. 15.
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foreclosure or default. Thereafter, the participating bank
will hold these mortgages to allow them to season. After this
period, the bank will assume the total mortgage risk provided
payments remain up to date.
Most participants will be required to pay a small "risk
premium" into a guarantee fund or towards the PMI premium.
The HTF will then pay the initial cost and the monthly payment
with each participant paying back all or a portion of these
cost, according to their ability to pay. Total outlays will
amount to no greater than $7,500.
Other stipulations of this policy require the participant
to have enough savings to cover 5 percent of the downpayment
and closing cost. Moreover, the buyer must be ineligible for
a standard mortgage product, so as to provide this opportunity
to those who truly need it. Lastly, if the participant
defaults on their loan, the bank is obligated to seek legal
recourse to recoup the loss from the participant, with the
money retrieved used to pay back the HTF and the outstanding
loan amount.
Rehabilitation
Under the final program, the supply of affordable housing
available to HTF participants is increased by preserving the
existing stock and/or by providing new housing. The funds for
this program are supplied by the HTF in conjunction with
dollar matches that are to be provided by MHFA.
The first part of the program incorporates the MHFA
requirements for eligible buyers (those with incomes less than
120% of area median income) who purchase homes or condominiums
that need at least $3,000 in renovations. After the
participant secures financing, which may be liberalized
through MHFA, to purchase and renovate the unit, the HTF
provides up to $5,000 in rehabilitation funds as a non-
interest bearing, permanent recapture loan with additional
monies provided by the state government. Priority is given to
those units that are located in economically distressed areas
where the properties are foreclosed or blighted.'
The second component of the policy concerns the provision
of below market rate rental set-asides for union members in
exchange for the use of HTF monies to for-profit and not-for-
profit developers who are rehabilitating blighted or
foreclosed properties and/or developing new housing. Through
this program, developers must agree to set-aside housing units
for HTF participants for at least 5 years. The maximum loan
amount per set-aside units is $5,000 with project selection
based upon a combination of project risk and feasibility,
community benefit and the number of rental units set-aside.
In all four of the previous policies -- downpayment,
mortgage interest rate, non-conforming and rehabilitation
7Many Local 26 members reside in such communities like
Dorchester, Roxbury, Mattapan, Cambridge and Sommerville.
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loans -- resale restrictions apply to the property.
Participants are required to sign a limited equity restriction
incorporated into the deed restricting the amount of
appreciation the buyer can realize annually to 5 percent or
set to the Consumer Price Index, whichever is the lesser, for
fifty years. This restriction remains intact regardless of
changes in ownership. In addition, union members will have
the first right of refusal to buy the property. If the owner
wants to sell the property at any time, he or she must contact
UNAC and give them three months to locate a qualified buyer
from the membership. If UNAC is unsuccessful in locating a
buyer, the owner can sell the house to anyone of their choice
at the specified price with the new owner required to maintain
the equity restriction and the right of first refusal with
UNAC members.
Problems with HTF Distributional Criteria
Now that the union has formulated a preliminary plan for
providing housing assistance, it must take the even more
difficult second step toward constructing a criteria by which
this assistance will be distributed. This task is
particularly problematic because workers confront different
housing situations and have different capacities to afford
housing.
The appropriate funding choices ultimately depend on the
target population, with the caveat that all trust benefits, as
required by U.S. labor law, must represent the interest of
every union member. This means that the benefit will have to
be allocated in a way that helps all members, while
simultaneously providing housing assistance to those who need
it most.
This poses a serious problem. UNAC has a very small pool
of money and yet it must distribute this with an eye toward
the interest of all members. But, trying to meet every
members' needs with this scarce $1.5 million, given that 75%
need housing assistance, is not possible.
A simple example bears this out. Suppose 200 low-income
members (or 4% of membership) seek interest subsidies at the
maximum amount of $1,500. At this rate, the HTF would be
depleted in one year with little or no payback. Some might
argue that such intense use of a Trust is preposterous. But
is it? Almost every member could benefit and qualify for some
type of housing assistance. Couple this with workers
preoccupation to secure housing, especially in a declining
real estate market that has produced reduced housing prices,
and members will scramble to secure their piece of the HTF
pie.
Under such a scenario, UNAC can take one of two
distributional routes or engage in the familiar struggle of
changing U.S. labor law. First, UNAC can either provide
minimal financial assistance to many members, while providing
insufficient assistance to the lowest income members. Or
provide large subsidies to a few,-very needy members, while
scantly providing assistance to moderate- and higher income
members; it cannot do both.
If UNAC is unwilling to make this choice, while clinging
to its commitment of providing assistance to the lowest
income, its best bet is to amend present U.S. labor law
requiring that all benefits represent the interest of every
worker. First, UNAC could try to seek an exemption from this
law by noting their peculiar situation of having such large
disparities among member incomes and the irreconcilable trade-
off this presents. If this proves unsuccessful, UNAC could
take on the more politically charged task of allowing unions
to direct their benefits to whom they see fit.
Although Local 26 is experienced in changing labor law (a
la the HTF movement), it seems very unlikely that such an act
would produce strong political constituencies among union
members and Congress given that all members are contributing
to the HTF and therefore will want to benefit. Thus, UNAC is
caught between a rock and a hard place on the issue of how to
distribute this benefit.
The union has been reluctant to acknowledge this
predicament. Granted it has envisioned six forms of housing
assistance that will move toward satisfying many members'
housing needs, the union cannot possibly meet all the housing
needs of its financially diverse membership. In any case the
union must still formulate a criteria by which to distribute
this benefit.
In designing the criteria for their distributional
policy, UNAC has tentatively looked to include issues of
seniority, status as first time homebuyer, current housing
situation, rent as a percentage of income, savings, income in
relation to Boston AMI, credit history and ability to pay.
Generally, participants are prioritized according to need in
relation to these characteristics, with the weighted
importance of each yet to be determined. The criteria, as
drafted, specifies either a minimum, maximum or range of
income or savings in order to qualify (adjusted for family
size). Priority is then given to lower-income persons who
have less savings within these parameters. Seniority fits
into this calculus as well, with greater priority given to
participants who have been members of the union longer ( a
minimum of two years is required to receive any assistance).
For those who live in a hazardous situation or are first time
homebuyers emphasis and priority is placed on resolving this
condition. The criteria also separately takes into account
rent and debt as a percentage of income, with priority given
to those who pay a larger percentage of their income for rent
and debt. Like income, the criteria specifies either a
minimum, maximum or range of savings in order to qualify, with
lower income participants receiving greater priority.
Beyond these general criteria, all participants must meet
the following requirements. First, participants must have an
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income that supports a reasonable-sales price or rent for the
type of unit they want to buy.8 Second, any credit history
problems must be resolved. That is, outstanding debts must be
cured with an explanation concerning their origination.
Thereafter, for one year, the participant must develop good
credit before buying. Lastly, participants are responsible
for repaying the HTF money whenever possible. The ability to
pay will be determined by an affordability matrix that relates
household income in relation to the median income level within
the Boston SMSA, rent as a percentage of income and family
size (see table 3 below).
Table 3
Affordability Matrix
Percent of median
0-30% 31-50% 51-80% 81-100%
100%+
Inc. Spent on Rent
Monthly Payment and Payback Term:
0-30%
1-3 persons $0 $20 $30 $60 $80
4-6 persons $0 $0 $20 $50 $70
6+ persons $0 $0 $0 $40 $60
31-40%
1-3 persons $0 $0 $20 $50 $70
4-6 persons $0 $0 $0 $40 $60
6+ persons $0 $0 $0 $30 $50
41-50%
1-3 persons $0 $0 $0 $40 $60
4-6 persons $0 $0 $0 $30 $50
6+ persons $0 $0 $0 $20 $40
* This can be varied based on savings or other cash holdings.
* Amounts determined by UNAC and member.
* 0 indicates no payback is required.
------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: UNAC
8According to the Union this doesn't mean the employee cannot
buy or rent a more expensive unit, but that the HTF will not pay
for this choice.
Although the union criteria directs HTF resources to
lower-income applicants, it does not sufficiently address
instances where workers are of such low-incomes that they
cannot locate an affordable rental or homeownership
opportunity. Rather, UNAC simply notes that all members must
have an "income that supports a reasonable rent or purchase
price", while failing to acknowledge that this approach
diminishes housing assistance and opportunities for the lowest
income. This is clearly a problem for UNAC, especially for
those administering the housing program who are committed to
the "socially correct" view of providing assistance to the
most needy while departing from the "creaming" that occurs in
many federal- and state-assisted housing programs.
Resource scarcity prevents adequate assistance to the
most needy which is extremely hard for UNAC to swallow. But
the realities of housing markets, politics and resources
suggest providing assistance to the most needy may prove an
irreconcilable trade-off. Local 26 has taken measures to
resolve this issue by enrolling members into section 8 and
Boston Housing Authority (i.e. public housing) waiting list.
Moreover, the rental and lease-up guarantee policies have
addressed this issue as well. But, none of these policies
guarantee housing opportunities outright to the most needy.
Policy Options
The distributional policy contained in the following
programs could potentially ease this trade-off. However,
these policy options generate serious concerns that center
around political and financial feasibility, equity and
compatibility with membership needs.
Cash Grants to the Lowest-Income
Although almost all workers are considered low-income by
HUD guidelines, within the context of the union, there are
clearly high- and low-income workers (see table 1). Thus, one
policy approach would be to provide more assistance to the
low-income workers, with a concomitant decrease in assistance
to the high income workers. Specifically, an outright cash
grant could be made available for first and last months' rent
plus security deposit at a certain percent of the area median
income, instead of a loan.
Such an approach poses two serious problems for UNAC.
First, this policy requires a permanent and deep subsidy,
while not contributing to the sustainment of the HTF pool.
Since UNAC is committed to the notion that HTF monies must be
systematically replaced so that monies remain available for as
many members as possible this policy would be difficult to
implement.
Second, this trade-off may prove politically
unacceptable. Any change in policy that diverts resources
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away from one group to another will be perceived as an attack;
especially when almost all members are in need of some housing
assistance. Moreover, since the union promotes the slogan of
"question authority" they can be certain that any perceived
preferential treatment, regardless of the reason why, will be
challenged.
Dollar Matches
Issues of homeownership for very low-income workers have
also been skirted. Under the current downpayment assistance
policy, UNAC has indicated that it might provide a 60 percent
dollar for dollar match, up to $5,000, for participants who
are at or below 80 percent of the Boston Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA) median income. Yet, providing the
same assistance below a certain threshold is oblivious to the
varying degrees of need that exist below this point. Clearly,
a two wage earner household at 75 percent of the area median
income will require less assistance than a two wage earner
household at 40 percent of the area median income. Yet, under
this program, these two households are viewed through the same
lens with no provisions made for those individuals who are
clearly more needy. Such a policy, although not publicly
stated, clearly acknowledges UNAC's inability to provide
sufficient resources to the very low-income.
A different approach, which incorporates income in
comparison to necessary expenses might prove more equitable.
For example, a single-headed household with one child and an
income at 50 percent of the AMI, may only be able to save $24
per week toward a $8,736 downpayment, thus taking seven years
to achieve this end. This time period could be decreased to 3
years by providing a contribution of $4,992. Another employee
may have an income at 80 percent of the median and be capable
of saving $40 a week, thereby saving enough money for the
downpayment in a little over four years. This could be
decreased to 3 years with a contribution equal to $2,912. In
each instance, the dollar match more appropriately reflects
the financial condition of the applicant. However, this
spotlights the issue of providing deeper subsidies to more
needy workers; which is something UNAC has had difficulty
reconciling.
Buydown Accounts
As the interest buydown program is presently structured,
all participants, regardless of income, are subject to the
same percentage buydown account, with buydown costs differing
according to mortgage amount. Yet, this singular application,
might better service low-income applicants if the buydown
percentages varied according to a sliding scale either
determined solely by income or a mixture of gross income for
all household wage earners in relation to housing cost and
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number of dependents. For instance, an employee whose income
is at 50 percent of the median income and is the sole provider
for the household, could be entitled to a deeper and/or longer
buydown. On the other hand, an employee whose income is at 80
percent of median income with two wage earners would receive a
shorter and/or more shallow subsidy. This policy of providing
longer buydowns is sensitive to the reality that lower income,
single earner households are less likely to substantially
increase their incomes over a longer period than higher income
two wage earner families.
Alternatives to UNAC Housing Program
UNAC could, instead of attempting to implement their
housing program, use the HTF monies to capitalize and start a
revolving loan fund (RLF) or a credit union (CU), while
continuing to provide housing counseling services. Although
not on the cutting edge like many Local 26 innovations, RLFs
and CUs are tried and true means for providing financial
assistance to low-income people who are often overlooked by
contemporary commercial lending institutions.
The first alternative to the HTF is the RLF. An RLF is a
pool of money often used by community development
organizations and other non-profit agencies for the purpose of
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making direct loans, loan guarantees, loan insurance, reduced
interest loans and sometimes equity. As loans are repaid by
borrowers, the money is returned to the RLF to make other
loans. In this manner, the Fund becomes an ongoing or
revolving financial tool.'
UNAC could use such a mechanism to provide housing
assistance to its members. Specifically, a loan guarantee or
insurance could help members secure conventional financing by
reducing risk exposure to conventional lenders. UNAC could
also augment this risk-reduction effort by linking repayment
of RLF monies to payroll deductions or pension funds.
Additionally, UNAC, taking from its housing program, could
offer rental guarantees, interest buydowns and downpayment
assistance (equity).
The added advantage of such an approach, as opposed to
the housing program, is that RLFs have a proven track record
in providing assistance to low-income people and thus are more
acceptable to landlords, bankers and the like. Additionally,
the RLF could be capitalized by the employer contributions and
possibly through contributions made by foundations, religious
institutions and philanthropic organizations. Although UNAC
might face a challenge since most RLFs are provided to a
defined geographical area, they might change this, through
9United States Department of Commerce. Economic Development
Administration Revolving Loan Fund Guidelines (draft). (Washington
D.C. Economic Development Administration Directives System, June 9,
1980). p. 2.
their political organizing skills, to include employment.
RLFs does not avoid the distributional concerns
contemplated under the HTF. However, UNAC could ease this
trade off by requiring that all money received through
employer contributions be provided to all members, while
contributions through foundations and the like be specifically
directed to the lowest-income workers.
Although different from a RLF, a credit union could
provide equally salient benefits to Local 26 members. A
credit union, is a cooperative, non-profit organization
incorporated under state or federal law, by and for people
affiliated by a preexisting common bond (i.e. neighborhood,
employment), for the purpose of promoting thrift among its
members and of loan funds to its membership at reasonable
rates." By limiting membership to people that have a common
occupational bond, the theory is that credit services will be
readily available to all members so that deposits and loans
can be made promptly without undue risk. Additionally, the CU
lends exclusively to its membership (while accepting deposits
from non-members) thus allowing the money to work on members
behalf.
Since UNAC has staff experienced in finance and ample
work space, the start up of the CU does not appear
problematic. Funds could be capitalized by member and non-
10Brad J. Caftel et al. Community Development Credit Unions.
(Berkeley, CA: National Economic Development Law Project, March,
1978) p. 34
member deposits and the HTF, thereby increasing loan capacity
beyond the level of the HTF. 11 To ensure that people pay
loans on time, which affects CUs ability to make loans,
payments could be made through payroll deductions or lump sum
benefits made at employment termination. Such financial
assistance could be provided with the already existing
homebuyer counseling service and start up could be further
facilitated through technical assistance provided by the
larger network of CUs in Boston. 12
Although a CU is attractive, it does not solve all UNAC's
problems. First, a CU, by law, may not have outstanding loans
exceeding 25 percent of its assets." This requirement
severely limits the amount of money UNAC can offer to its
membership. Second, the CU does not get around the
distributional problem noted under the HTF. Since all members
contribute to the fund, all members must benefit. However, as
noted under the RLF, personal deposits made by members could
be directed to low-income people. Such a policy would
probably produce a weak political constituency and do nothing
toward resolving the distributional dilemma. However, the CU
"Member deposits could produce great loan capacity given that
Local 26 has 5,000 members.
12There is the Massachusetts Credit Union Association, Boston
Carpenter's Credit Union and Local 592, Food Store & Allied Workers
Federal Credit Union that could provide assistance.
"Brad J. Caftel et al. Community Development Credit Unions.
(Berkeley, CA: National Economic Development Law Project. March,
1978) p. 148.
is an accepted institution and any loan guarantees or loan
made through it will be more readily accepted by the lending
and landlord communities.
Summary
UNAC has gone to great lengths to structure their housing
program. Yet their effort to direct assistance to the most
needy has created the additional problem of having to
reconcile the irreconcilable. That is, UNAC wants to provide
direct financial assistance through the HTF to the lowest-
income workers even though they are legally compelled to
distribute this assistance to all members. Some of this trade
off has been mitigated through the housing program with the
effect of providing insufficient assistance to the lowest
income.
UNAC, through its present distributional criteria, is
capable of allocating funds to low-income members, but it has
not addressed instances where workers have incomes that are so
low that they cannot meet monthly rent payments, even with the
rental guarantee. Rather, UNAC notes that members must have
an income that supports a reasonable rent or mortgage.
Although not explicitly stated, such a policy directs
assistance to a wide range of members (i.e. low-, moderate-
and high-income) while providing inadequate assistance to the
poorest members.
This dilemma stems not from some inherent problem with
the UNAC program, rather the legal requirement of providing
assistance to all members coupled with the limited financial
resources and section 8 funds creates this antagonism. To
address this issue, UNAC could provide outright grants for
rental assistance to the lowest-income or simply guarantee
loans to people below a certain median income. To solve the
legal provision, the union could attempt to change U.S. labor
law so that funds could be directed to a specific income group
(i.e. the lowest income). UNAC could also attempt to expand
their lending capacity by scrapping the housing program and
replacing it with a CU or a RLF, capitalized by employer and
foundation contributions and in the case of CUs, member
deposits. Lastly, UNAC, as noted in the following two
chapters, can also combine its resources with other federal,
state and local housing subsidy programs, thereby expanding
its resources. Yet, the bottom line under any policy is that
none of these options can reconcile the distributional trade
off and political haggling that must be made when resources
are scarce.
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CHAPTER 3
Leveraging Opportunities with the 1990
National Affordable Housing Act
The ability of UNAC's housing program to meet its
membership's needs is not solely dependent upon how well it
distributes its HTF monies, rather, the success of the program
will also be affected by how well UNAC positions itself to
take advantage of public assistance funds and housing
programs. Specifically, with the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez
National Affordable Housing Act having been passed, it is
important that UNAC understand how it can combine its
resources with the cornerstones of this Act -- the HOME
Investment Partnership Act (HOME) and the Homeownership and
Opportunity for People Everywhere Programs (HOPE).'
The 1990 National Affordable Housing Act provides the
most significant advance in housing programs since the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974. While it does not
restore the large funding cuts experienced during the Reagan
years, and consequently will not in itself lead to large
increases in affordable housing units, it does reaffirm the
federal acknowledgement of the 1949 goal of a decent home in a
suitable living environment for every American family.
'The HOME program has no acronym.
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The new legislation also takes a different approach in
funding future housing programs. Instead of funding programs
categorically, local jurisdictions are given more latitude in
the way funds are used with the government now supplying block
grants to states and entitlement communities and local
jurisdictions supplying required matching funds.2
The new funding approach is not the only element of the
Act that deviates from past federal housing policies, rather,
the purposes of the Act differ as well. The general purposes
of the Act are, among other things, to (1) facilitate
downpayment savings for homebuying; (2) retain, where
feasible, affordable federally-assisted housing for low-income
families; (3) extend public and private partnerships to
produce and operate housing affordable for low-income and
moderate-income families; and (4) expand and improve federal
rental assistance for very low-income families.
HOME
One of the major components of the 1990 Act is the HOME
program. Under HOME both the Housing Assistance Plan,
formerly required for CDBG funds, and the Comprehensive
Homeless Assistance Plan, required under the McKinney Act, are
2Housing Assistance Council, Housincg Legislation to
Begin in the Nineties: A Summary of the Rural Provisions in
the Cranston/Gonzalez Affordable Housing Act, PL 101-625.
(Washington D.C.: December, 1990) p. 1.
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replaced with the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy
(CHAS) .3 This is a five-year action-oriented plan that serves
as a working guide for the communities use of federal and
other housing resources. This strategy is important because
it is a prerequisite for receipt of HUD assistance by state or
local governments commencing in Fiscal year 1992.4
In preparing the CHAS for submission to the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) states and
localities are required to solicit the views and comments of
citizens through a participatory planning process. Given this
requirement, UNAC should immediately begin tapping their
proven organizing skills so that they can have their concerns
and comments, and legitimacy as a non-profit, incorporated
into the housing strategy.'
Toward this effort, there are a couple of issues which
UNAC must address to produce a more responsive local housing
strategy. First, a description of the private and non-profit
organizations and public institutions that will help implement
the community's housing strategy is required. It is important
for UNAC to be included as one of these organizations so that
the concerns and housing conditions of their members can be
3Housing Assistance Council." HUD Publishes Interim Rule
for Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategies". HAC News.
February 20, 1991, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 1.
4National Housing Law Project. "State and Local Housing
Strategies (Title I) and the HOME Program (Title II) ". Housing
Law Bulletin. Vol. 21, January/February 1991. p. 2.
sHousing & Development Reporter, December 10, 1990 p. 669
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adequately addressed in the CHAS.- Including UNAC under this
description is also important given that present federal
support for housing, and probably future housing support, will
be allocated through the housing strategy plan. Second, a
description of the resources that are to be used for the
matching requirements under HOME and how they will be
leveraged is required. Since the definitions concerning
acceptable matches are still in fluid, UNAC should quickly and
strongly advocate that its HTF money be viewed as an
acceptable matching source. This will allow UNAC to better
leverage its resources with the end result of providing more
housing opportunities for its membership.
UNAC should communicate early with key housing players
who are structuring the housing strategy so that they may have
their concerns reflected in the CHAS. Specifically, UNAC
should find out which administrative agency and people will be
developing the plan. Moreover, UNAC should locate some
housing experts, who are not only sympathetic to their needs
but to the needs of a low-income population, who will assist
in reviewing the CHAS. These experts might be employees of
the local government, academics or individuals involved in
housing and economic development consulting. Recognizing the
low-income nature of members will create legislation that is
more reflective and responsive to UNAC's needs, with the
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ultimate result of providing members with more housing
opportunities.'
In addition to the CHAS requirement, the objective of
HOME is to expand the supply of affordable housing, especially
rental housing, to very low- and low-income persons while
expanding the capacity of non-profit community housing
development organizations (CHDO) to primarily rehabilitate and
build such housing. The cultivation and nurturing of this
development capacity is primarily achieved by having CHDOs
serve as the predominant builders and recipients of local and
state block grant funds with the benefit to UNAC being that
these units will come to the market at a faster rate with
prices substantially below market.
The new reliance on non-profit organizations is not the
only virtue of the HOME program, rather the income targeting
requirements complement the economic characteristics of the
union members as laid out in the UNAC housing program and the
1ocal 26 housing needs assessment study. Specifically, at
least, 90 percent of the rental assistance funds must be
invested in housing initially occupied by families with
incomes below 60 percent of the area median income (AMI).
The remaining 10 percent is open to people with incomes at 80
percent of the AMI. Both of these requirements serve to
6This is particularly timely since the public commenting
period is open until June, 1991.
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benefit UNAC members, many of whom have incomes that lie below
50 and 80 percent of the Boston AMI.
Rents also fall within limits that complement UNAC
members' financial conditions. According to Section 215,
rents cannot exceed the lesser of the existing Section 8 fair
market rents for comparable units in the area or 30 percent of
the adjusted income for a family with an income at 65 percent
of the AMI. Additionally, at least 20 percent of any units in
a development must be occupied by very low-income households
(below 50 percent AMI) who either pay no more than 30 percent
of their incomes for rent or whose gross rents do not exceed
30 percent of the 50 percent of median threshold.
As with rental units, homeownership units have income and
sales price ceilings that not only suit members' financial
conditions, but parallel UNAC's housing program requirements.
Specifically, homebuying opportunities are only open to people
who have incomes below 80 percent of the AMI, are first-time
homebuyers and are purchasing a unit where the initial price
does not exceed 95 percent of the median purchase price for
the area (adjusted for structure and age of housing).
Option 1
Beyond simply scaling down rents and home prices and
targeting them to low-income people, HOME provides for tenant-
based rental assistance for those individuals who need it.
This form of assistance, which is- an addition beyond Section 8
vouchers, is only provided if it is included as "an essential
element of the jurisdiction's annual housing strategy",
substantiated through the local housing market conditions.
The City of Boston's ability to validate such market
conditions should not be difficult to make given its
recognized dearth of affordable rental units under the most
recent Federal Register HOME regulations. 7 However, UNAC
should not simply rely on the city to make this case. Rather,
they should join with housing activists at all levels (i.e.
religious based groups, CHDOs, senior citizen organizations
etc.) to form a broad-based coalition that will push to have
the severity of the rental housing condition reflected in the
city's housing strategy. That is, all groups should advocate
that rental assistance be provided in tandem with affordable
rental housing production because assistance is useless if no
affordable units exist.
To fully realize such an opportunity, UNAC must continue
to encourage its income-eligible members to be included on the
Section 8 waiting list since only these individuals are
eligible for the additional tenant-based rental assistance.
Once UNAC members have done this, they are then eligible to
receive two-year renewable rental assistance contracts. This
assistance could substantially alleviate rents and rent
7Federal Register, Vol 56, No. 53, March 19, 1991, p.
11595.
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burdens on private units for the very low-income if it is
combined and coordinated the UNAC rental guarantee. For
instance, if a two person household with no savings has an
income of $16,000, they can only afford to pay $400 a month
for rent given the 30 percent of income guideline applied
under Section 8. If the unit rents for $625 a month, the
household is not only short $225 on rent per month, it is also
short $1,875 for the move-in cost. 8 However, a housing
opportunity could be created with the tenant-based rental
assistance covering the $225 monthly deficit and the UNAC
rental guarantee securing the $1,875 move-in cost. UNAC's
past adeptness at negotiating the section 8 program will prove
useful here and could ultimately provide members with more
housing opportunities.
Option 2
A more ambitious and innovative, yet albeit less certain,
opportunity under HOME would be to offer financial assistance
through the HTF or union pension funds. 9 Such assistance
could come in the form of a construction loan or contingency
reserve and be coupled with cash advances, loans, equity
8The move-in cost total $1,875 assuming that it requires
two months rent plus a security deposit equal to one months
rent.
9Any investment of union pension funds must provide a
market rate of return with minimum risk which is difficult to
meet when investing in affordable housing.
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investments and interest subsidies provided by HOME. In
return for their financial commitment, UNAC could seek a set
number of units reserved for its members at below market
rents.
If such an option proves unacceptable to the developer of
the housing, UNAC could seek to buy a set number of units,
under contract, prior to completion of construction or when
units have just come on line. Such an arrangement is enticing
to developers because it decreases the risk of not selling the
units which is a real concern in a declining real estate
market like Boston. In exchange for this pre-construction
lease-up, UNAC would seek a reduced purchase price for its
membership.
Although such an option seems "quick and easy", it is
not. First few UNAC members that are low-income have the
financial means to purchase a home. For those that do, such
an option could provide housing. For those that are not so
fortunate, but are close to buying, their financial condition
and chances of purchasing could be augmented through interest
rate buydowns, downpayment assistance and non-conforming
loans. For any other members, particularly the very low-
income, with no downpayment or bad credit histories, such an
option would prove ineffective.
Option 3
Another housing opportunity occurs through the matching
requirements mandated by HOME. To receive the HOME block
grant funds, the participating jurisdiction must contribute
some of its own financial resources, with the amount of the
matching requirement dependent on the type of housing
assisted. In each fiscal year, a jurisdiction must contribute
$1 for ever $3 used for substantial rehabilitation, and $1 for
every $2 used for new construction, illustrating the de-
emphasis on supply-side housing policy.
The types of acceptable matching contributions can take
many forms. Among other things, they can come from the value
of waived or deferred taxes and fees or from the value of land
and other real property used to achieve affordability of HOME-
assisted housing.
For UNAC, the most seemingly inviting match comes from
"cash contributions from non-federal" public or private
resources.10 This match is important to UNAC because any
money they provide will be viewed as a private contribution.
Thus, according to Jeannie Fewell, a senior member of the
Florida housing consulting firm of Reynolds, Smith & Hills who
have worked extensively on HOME and CHAS, if UNAC were to
0To be a cash contribution, the funds must be permanently
contributed to the HOME program. That is, all repayments of
principal and interest or other return of investment on
matching funds goes to the HOME program to be used for
additional activities. This money is not repaid.
92
contribute money from the HTF or union pension funds to a
jurisdiction, it could realize up to a 4 to 1 match. However,
"funds that are loaned to a project may qualify as a matching
contribution... only if all repayments of principal and
interest are deposited in the participating jurisdiction's
HOME Investment Trust Account (which is where all the HOME
funds are held) to be used in accordance with the requirements
of the HOME program."" This effectively ties up UNAC's
money, which cannot be recouped, while providing them no
assurance that the matching money will directly benefit
them. UNAC only recourse would be to strike a deal with the
local jurisdiction or a CHDO rehabilitating or developing the
site that would allow them to get a set-aside at a reduced
price in return for their financial contribution."
Option 4
Another HOME program component that provides UNAC with
housing opportunities for its members occurs under the
Subtitle B, Community Housing Partnership (CHP). Under this
program, Secretary Kemp's reliance on CHDOs is bolstered by
having at least 15 percent of each participating
"Federal Register, Vol. 56, No. 53, March 19, 1991, p.
11598.
12According to officials at HUD, no strings can be
attached to private contributions as of yet. However, they
did say this might change once the public review process is
completed.
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jurisdiction's HOME funds earmarked for 18 months for
investment in affordable housing to be developed, sponsored or
owned by CHDOs. Essentially, up to 10 percent of the
mandatory 15 percent set-aside of HOME funds are specifically
directed at technical assistance and site control loans, with
other acceptable funding including feasibility studies, seed
money loans and various legal, architectural and consulting
fees.
The CHP also makes HOME funds available for
organizational support and housing education grants to "non-
profit intermediary organizations" that customarily provide,
in more than one community, services related to the provision
of housing affordable to people of low- and moderate-incomes.
The intermediary must also have experience in providing
technical assistance to community-based developers of
affordable housing. Specifically, the organizational
assistance may be used to cover such things as operational
expenses, legal and engineering assistance and training of
CHDO staff. Educational assistance may be used "to cover
expenses to educate, counsel or organize homeowners and
tenants who are eligible to receive assistance through HOME
activities.""
The opportunities available to UNAC under CHP are not
clear. Although the main thrust of UNAC's housing program is
"Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act,
Section 233, Housing Education and Organizational Support.
November 28, 1991.
to provide educational homebuying-services to people in
communities throughout Boston, thus meeting some of the CHP
regulations, UNAC is not likely to qualify as an intermediary
given their lack of experience in providing technical
assistance to CHDOs. In fact, according to Marsha Stilts at
HUD, who has been involved in drafting of the HOME
regulations, "intermediaries are groups that provide financial
consulting services to many communities and CHDOs... such as
Community Builders in Boston."14
UNAC would also have a difficult time directly accessing
the educational assistance funds given that this money is
strictly for CHDOs. However, since many CHDOs do not provide
homebuying consulting services it may be worthwhile for UNAC
to contract its homebuyer educational services to CHDOs in the
area. In return for this service, UNAC could seek a reduced
price on units or union members or a designated number of
units set-aside for its membership. Although this sounds very
inviting, UNAC's uncertain relationship with local CHDOs,
especially given Local 26's political backing of a highly
flammable measure to prevent tax hikes, could cut any such
UNAC-CHDO partnership.
"
4Community Builders is a non-profit technical assistance
firm that provides financial consulting services to many CHDOs
throughout Boston.
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Option 5
The REACH asset-recycling program offers greater
assistance than CHP through a more structured program.
Although it does not offer the most attractive housing (most
are public housing sites), it does provide participating
jurisdictions with information about properties owned or
controlled by HUD in which HOME funds can be used for their
purchase, rehabilitation or development. Specifically,
properties must be vacant 1-4 family dwellings appraised at
less than 95 percent of the area median purchase price.
HUD has begun taking great strides to sell off these
units with Secretary Kemp boasting that this program will help
in realizing "his goal of assisting 1 million new low-income
homeowners and first-time homebuyers by 1992.",15 UNAC members
could greatly benefit from this selling policy by either
purchasing these below-market priced projects in partnership
with a CHDO, by helping UNAC members purchase units on their
own with HTF-assisted downpayment, interest subsidy or non-
conforming loan assistance or by providing homebuying
counseling services that will help members quickly locate
favorable projects and lenders so that they may "beat" other
potential buyers to the purchasing punch. However, it is
important to note that purchasing a project with a CHDO might
"Housing Affairs Letter, ( Silver Spring, MD: CD
Publications No. 90-46 November 16, 1990) p. 1.
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provide UNAC with the best sales -terms in the area given the
federal commitment to expanding the development capacity of
CHDOs.
The main obstacle in realizing such an opportunity under
REACH does not stem from any government obstacles. Rather, it
is the preference of UNAC members, to own detached, single
family homes that diminishes this window of opportunity. UNAC
members cannot be faulted for such a preference, especially in
a country where homeownership conjures up images of a detached
home on a single plot of land, and not a cooperative housing
development or condominium that shares adjoining walls. Yet,
UNAC must attempt to debunk this unrealistic ideal. This is
not to say that UNAC should not promote the traditional
American dream of homeownership, but, it should balance this
with educating members about the virtues of other forms of
homeownership, especially for the very low-income members who
might never be able to amass the large downpayment and monthly
debt service that is necessary to purchase a traditional
home.'"
Option 6
UNAC can promote both traditional and non-traditional
forms of homeownership through the Subtitle D, Specified
"
6According to UNAC staff member Carol Ridge only two
people have purchased shares in a cooperative in the last 3
months.
Models Program. Under these mode-i programs, HUD will make
repayable advances to public, private and non-profit
organizations and individuals interested in constructing,
acquiring or substantially rehabilitating affordable rental
housing, limited equity cooperatives, mutual housing and
single- and multi-family residences. Although there are
several programs offered under this subtitle, only two offer
UNAC members direct housing assistance and opportunities.
The Rehabilitation Loan Program provides direct loans to
people with incomes below 80 percent of the AMI to finance the
rehabilitation of their single-family and multi-family
residential properties. Although the exact terms of the loan
have yet to be determined, HUD has indicated that it will
provide them at a few points below market while targeting them
to people who live in areas that contain a substantial number
of dwellings in need of rehabilitation. Such targeting
requirements favor UNAC members given their frequent residence
in economically depressed areas. Moreover, such a program can
reach lower-income members and make housing rehabilitation
more affordable if provided in tandem with the HTF interest
loan buydown and rehabilitation program.
First, the UNAC rehabilitation loan program is targeted
to the same economically distressed areas and income range
(below 80 percent of the AMI) where residences need at least
$3,000 in renovations. Thus, the member by qualifying for one
program would by default qualify for the other. Since these
loans are provided at a low interest rate, the member could
save a substantial sum of money on rehabilitation while
creating a housing opportunity. Second, the UNAC interest
subsidy could be used to write down the interest on the
federal rehabilitation loan further making monthly debt
service payments smaller and qualifying for such loans easier.
The HUD-sponsored Second Mortgage Assistance Program also
provides members with attractive financing. Under this
program, local governments will provide 5 year deferred-
payment second mortgages for first-time homebuyers that cover
30 percent of the purchase price at an interest rate of 4
percent. These terms provide affordable financing that can be
further written down with HTF monies. This is important
because these additional HTF funds can act as the "deep
subsidies" that are necessary to make such financing available
to the very low-income.
Option 7
The last opportunity for UNAC under HOME is delineated
under the Subtitle C, "Other Support for State and Local
Housing Strategies". Through this policy, HUD is to undertake
a variety of activities to assist state and local agencies,
for-profit and non-profit entities in identifying and meeting
affordable housing needs. One such activity it provides
funding for is "the establishment and efficient operation of
employer-assisted housing programs through research, technical
assistance and demonstration projects. "17
Providing employer-assisted housing is neither novel or
untried. However, the creation of a partnership between
employees and employers has often meet with ambivalence and
little action on behalf of government. 1" The federal
government wants to change this past by supporting employer
involvement in housing with the benefit that such an effort
brings new financial resources and lending sophistication to
the housing finance marketplace at little public cost.
UNAC can take advantage of this new federal stance by
actively promoting the proposed low-income employer assistance
provided through its employer-assisted HTF. That is, UNAC
must focus on the low-income nature of its membership given
that the Subtitle C program is directed toward meeting
affordable housing needs of low-income people. By doing this,
UNAC will improve its chance of being selected as a funding
recipient.
Although no exact funding commitment has been made to
support such activities, UNAC should not be dissuaded from
pursuing and pushing for some type of assistance for promoting
their employer-assisted HTF. Whether or not this will prove
fruitful depends on HUD's commitment to carrying out their
"United States Congress. "Section 241 (5)".
Congressional Record. October 22, 1990. p. H11530.
'
8David Schwartz. A New Housing Policy for America.
(Temple University Press, Philadelphia, PA, 1988) p. 104.
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stated objective and UNAC's ability to adequately publicize
their partnership between management and employee.
Table 1
Review of Housing Opportunities under HOME
OPTION BENEFIT
Option 1 Tenant-based rental assistance provided as an addition to
section 8; to qualify must be on section 8 waiting list;
can be combined with rental guarantee to make it available
to very low-income.
Option 2 Provide financial assistance to developer through HTF,
union pension funds or pre-construction lease-up on HOME-
assisted units in exchange for a set-aside at below market
prices.
Option 3 Provide HTF monies as non-federal matching source with a
4:1 match and seek set-aside in return.
Option 4 UNAC contract out homebuying counseling services and in
return seek a set-aside at reduced prices or just a set-
aside.
Option 5 Assist CHDO and members in purchasing REACH projects; in
return UNAC seeks set-aside from CHDO.
Option 6 Below market loan and 5 year deferred second mortgages by
HUD made more affordable if coupled with HTF buydown and
rehabilitation assistance.
Option 7 Federal financial assistance provided for the promotion of
employer-assisted housing programs of which HTF is one.
Summary
Overall, HOME offers UNAC some attractive housing
assistance opportunities. The program, with its income
targeting and CHDO focus, provides rents and home prices that
fall in line with the economic means of many UNAC members.
However, these benefits are not specific to UNAC, but to all
low-income people. In an attempt to secure some of these
benefits UNAC can seek set-asides in return for their
financial and professional experience and assistance, yet, the
fruitfulness of such an endeavor is not clear given legal an
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programmatic constraints which will be elaborated upon in
chapter 5. This is not to say that HOME does not provide
housing opportunities for UNAC. On the contrary, by using HTF
monies, the attractive financing to UNAC members can be made
even more affordable.
Home Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE) Programs
The other major component of the 1990 National Affordable
Housing Act is the Title IV HOPE programs. The main thrust of
these three programs (HOPE I, II & III) is to facilitate the
sale of public or other government subsidized housing to non-
profit organizations for subsequent sale to low-income people
who may not be current residents of the housing being sold.
HUD plans to support this process by supplying planning and
implementation grants used toward the promotion and
implementation of homeownership programs.
Planning grants, which cannot total more than $200,000,
support both the implementation of homeownership programs and
projects by providing funding for the development of tenant
ownership programs, preliminary site work and homeownership
counseling. Planning grants are made available to non-profit
organizations, cooperative associations, resident management
corporations (RMC) and resident councils (RC) with approval
for funding based on a national competition which looks to the
development capacity of the organization, the suitability of
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the project for homeownership, and the extent of the tenant
interest in the program.
Implementation grants also provide support for the
acquisition or rehabilitation of the project, operating and
replacement reserves, relocation costs and other transaction
costs. To qualify for this grant, the developer or sponsor of
the project must at least provide a non-federal match on these
funds of 25 or 33 percent depending on the type of
development. Once this threshold is satisfied, the national
selection process ensues, much the same as with planning
grants, in which applicants are selected based on their
development capacity, feasibility and affordability of their
project, whether the project falls in line with the priorities
outlined in the CHAS and the amount of non-federal funds
contributed from other sources. Beyond this meager financing,
which totals more than $250,000 for both grants, FHA-insured
loans and conventional mortgages are available.
Surprisingly, once this is completed, present resale
restriction do not guarantee permanent affordability of units.
If units are transferred within 6 years the homeowner will
receive their equity contribution, value of any improvements
made during their tenure and an inflation adjustment on their
equity. However, between 6 and 20 years, the statute only
provides for the recapture of an amount equal to the remaining
balance an the promissory note and beyond 20 years no
recapture. Such a policy is directly contrary to UNAC's
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resale guideline, thus UNAC must again become involved in the
public review process of HOPE and to extend the affordability.
HOPE 1
The first component of the HOPE program, dubbed HOPE I,
provides funds to facilitate sales of public housing to RMCs,
RCs and cooperative associations, who in turn, sell ownership
interest or shares in the developments to eligible households.
To promote this program HUD only requires a 25 percent match
on non-federal sources for implementation grants. Under all
projects and programs (HOPE I, II, III) existing tenants are
given purchase preference, with the change to ownership having
to be agreed upon by at least half the existing tenants.
Those tenants who are either unwilling or not qualified to
purchase are given other public housing located elsewhere or a
Section 8 voucher with relocation cost paid. To ensure that
units go to low-income people, purchase of units are only open
to families who have incomes below 80 percent of the AMI, with
purchases not permitted to those families whose monthly
housing costs would exceed 30 percent of their monthly income.
Although the required match is small and the proposed
allocation to HOPE I is large, this program seems to provide
little opportunity for UNAC. First, as was noted in chapter
2, very few UNAC members live in public housing. This
substantially diminishes housing opportunities if every tenant
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in the public housing project plans to purchase their units.
However, this will not likely be the case. Instead, there
will be units open for purchase to families who meet the
income guidelines. But, even if units are open for purchase,
most UNAC members would be reluctant to move into cooperative
housing, not even to mention what was formerly public housing.
If the above two hurdles can be cleared, then this
program might supply UNAC members with some homeownership
opportunities. To realize such benefits, UNAC staff might try
directing members to HOPE cooperatives while emphasizing the
affordability of such units, especially when coupled with the
mortgage buydown supplied by the HTF. Additionally, UNAC
might take advantage of HUD's extreme willingness to sell
these units, given past failure to do so, by encouraging
members who want to own, but have poor credit histories, to
buy such units. HUD may be willing to accept this arrangement
if UNAC reduces the risk on such loans through the mortgage
insurance applied under the non-conforming loan program. All
told however, the program's ability to provide ownership
opportunities will largely depend on members willingness to
move into cooperative housing and not HUD's acceptance of
risky members.
HOPE II
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HOPE II better complements the housing opportunities that
most UNAC members desire. Properties that may be purchased
under this program include those of five or more units that
are (1) owned, financed or insured by HUD and are determined
by HUD to have serious financial or physical problems, or (2)
are owned or held by the Secretary of Agriculture, the
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) or a state or local
government.
The extent of the benefits this program has to offer UNAC
members is not clear. What is clear is that any benefits
derived by UNAC under HOPE II will only come through their own
initiative. Since both of the grant selection criteria put a
premium on the development capacity of the non-profit,
cooperative association or other sponsor managing the project,
UNAC must actively seek out such organizations and inform them
about how their HTF, pension funds and homebuyer counseling
services can improve the development capacity of the
organization thereby their probability of being selected for
grant funding.
In return for financial assistance and increased
development capacity UNAC could seek a set-aside of units
available to members at either market or below-market prices
depending on whether UNAC financial assistance is repaid. If
UNAC provides homebuyer counseling services it could seek one
of three things: (1) it could essentially contract its
homebuyer counseling services to the sponsoring organization
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in return for a set-aside of units; (2) seek a percentage of
the planning grant funds in payment of their homebuyer
counseling services, and give this money to members to augment
their financial capacity or (3) in exchange for this service,
seek in the form of a moderate reduction in home purchase
prices.
RTC-eligible properties, which came about because of the
Savings and Loan bailout, may also offer UNAC some affordable
homebuying opportunities on condominium and other properties
under HOPE II. Although the disposition of properties through
RTC has been slow, the average income of buyers who have
purchased properties through their Affordable Housing Program
(AHP) has been below 75 percent of the AMI. 19
Much of AHP has been geared toward providing affordable
housing opportunities through non-profit organizations. This
could prove a considerable boon to UNAC members if UNAC
provides financial or home counseling services, as above, in
exchange for a set-aside to UNAC members. That is, many of
the low-income buyers will need homebuying counseling
services, and given that UNAC is quite experienced in this
area, it could offer its services to all persons buying into
the development in exchange for a set-aside to its members.
Once this is secured, financing the purchase of a unit could
be facilitated through the HTF mortgage buydown, non-
conforming loan and downpayment assistance program.
"
9Housing and Development Reporter, May 28, 1990 p. 10.
107
This is a real opportunity for UNAC given that the RTC is
getting ready to step up its efforts to place projects on the
selling blocks through the AHP. By making early connections
with non-profits and other sponsors interested in purchasing
the projects, UNAC can position itself to fully realize the
benefits of the AHP program.
HOPE III
HOPE III is probably the most attractive HOPE program for
UNAC members in that it disposes of single-family properties,
which are what UNAC members want, owned or held by HUD, VA,
RTC, FmHA or a state or local government. Receipt of grants
are again based on a national competition applying the same
selection criteria as under HOPE II. Thus, UNAC could go into
partnership with a CHDO or other non-profit and improve its
probability of being selected for funding by improving the
development capacity of the CHDO as laid out in HOPE II.
Here again, UNAC could pursue two courses. First, UNAC
could request a set-aside of units in return for its homebuyer
counseling services or monetary payment for such services that
could then be used to provide additional financial resources
to UNAC members. Second, UNAC could also request a set-aside
of units at below-market or market prices based on a
combination of the size of the financial commitment and
whether advances are repayable. In instances where minimal
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financial assistance is required a straight set-aside may
suffice. However, where large assistance is supplied, UNAC
would seek significant price reductions on units. Lastly,
UNAC could again locate opportunities through RTC's AHP
program as under HOPE II.
The income requirements, which are the same as other HOPE
programs, essentially reserves these units for low-income
homebuyers. Unfortunately, such opportunities will not be
available to very low-income members since no more than 30
percent of monthly income can be spent on housing. However,
UNAC could attempt to cure this for some of its low-income
members by supplying buydown or downpayment assistance through
the HTF which will decease monthly housing costs payments.
UNAC could also make these housing opportunities under
HOPE I, II and III more tangible for their membership by
assisting them in locating projects where other non-profits
are engaged in such work without UNAC assistance.
Additionally, much of the homebuying process under any of the
HOME programs could be facilitated and expedited through UNAC
homebuying counseling and HTF financial assistance.
National Homeownership Trust
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Another attribute of both the HOME and HOPE programs that
facilitates the homebuying process is the Title III, National
Homeownership Trust. This program provides very attractive
financing that can be made even more attractive when coupled
with the HTF housing assistance. Specifically, the Trust,
which is operated by HUD, assist first-time homebuyers with
incomes below 95 percent of the AMI (115 in high cost areas)
to purchase FHA-insured homes or shares in limited equity
cooperatives. This assistance can be used to reduce the
purchaser's payable interest to 6 percent or less as well as
to provide assistance on downpayment and closing costs,
provided the buyer puts at least 1 percent down for the
downpayment.
The mortgage terms are attractive as well. For loans on
homes that are less than $50,000 the loan to value ratio (LTV)
is 98.7 percent excluding the up front premium. For loans
over $50,000 the LTV is 97.75 percent, again excluding the up-
front premium. The basic limit on mortgages is $67,000, but
in high-cost areas the limit jumps to $124,875; well within
the price range of what many UNAC members are looking for.
For mortgages executed in fiscal 1992, there will be an up-
front premium of 3.8 percent plus an annual premium of 0.5
percent for five years for mortgages with LTVs less than 90
percent, eight years for mortgages with LTVs of at least 90
percent but less than 95 percent, and 10 years for mortgages
exceeding 95 percent of value.
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Such attractive financing could be provided in concert
with the buydown and downpayment assistance offered through
the HTF thus making such an arrangement more affordable to
UNAC members. For example, the buydown could be used to
reduce the interest rate 300 basis points in the first two
years, 200 basis points in year 3 and 4 and 75 basis pints for
the next two years. Similarly, the HTF downpayment assistance
could be used to cover the requisite 1 percent downpayment.
Issues to be Resolved
If UNAC is to glean any housing benefits from programs
provided under HOME or HOPE, it must resolve a few key issues.
First, UNAC must attempt to change members' negative view of
cooperative housing if they are to benefit from Option 5 and
HOPE I. Movement in this direction can be made by
highlighting the affordability of such developments and the
virtues of owning as opposed to renting. Second, UNAC must
establish a dialogue with Boston-area CHDOs and other housing
developers concerning the complementary benefits of an
exchange between HTF financial and homebuying counseling
services and housing developer set-asides. Such an endeavor
is acutely important and problematic given that set-asides are
one of the only methods by which to access federal assistance
and yet normally prohibited in instances where public funds
are used in a development. Lastly, UNAC must determine
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whether it can use its HTF monies-to provide financial
assistance to developers of housing. That is, UNAC must
determine whether U.S. labor law permits the lending of union
trust money in a manner that benefits an outside party (i.e.
developer) while providing assistance to members.
Conclusion: A Strategy
HOME and HOPE, at first glance, appear to provide many
housing opportunities to UNAC members. However, the reality
is that this is not true. In fact, if UNAC is to benefit from
the legislation it must focus its energies, while
participating in the public review process, on HOME options 5
and 6 and HOPE III because these are the only programs that
provide any tangible benefits to UNAC members.
Option 5, which has the strong political backing of HUD's
Secretary Kemp, concerns the dissemination of information on
affordable, often times substandard and vacant, 1-4 family
units appraised at less that 95 percent of the area median
purchase price. Specifically, in instances where projects are
multi-family developments, UNAC must act quickly in locating
such properties and move immediately, if possible, with a CHDO
in securing development rights.
To secure access to units (set-asides), UNAC should offer
CHDOs financial assistance to develop the project while
vigorously extolling the financial and social benefits of such
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a partnership. Similarly, UNAC should highlight the racial
diversity of its membership to help the CHDO promote an
affirmative marketing plan while explaining to them that legal
statues prohibiting set-asides with use of public funds can be
overcome with political agitation. If the CHDO does not
welcome such a partnership, UNAC, upon learning of a housing
development, should help members negotiate the purchase of a
unit. Under either effort, UNAC can facilitate purchase
through HTF downpayment, interest buydown and rehabilitation
loan assistance. Since many of these units are not single-
family, detached homes, UNAC must also actively promote non-
traditional forms of homeownership.
Having secured a low-cost property through option 5, UNAC
should then look to improve and rehabilitate the development
through option 6 while capitalizing on the recent member trend
of purchasing "fixer-uppers". The beauty of option 6 is that
public policy and the UNAC housing program are moving in the
same direction. That is, the UNAC and federal government
rehabilitation loan programs are targeted to both properties
located in identical geographical areas and to people within
the same income range (below 80% AMI). Thus, by complying
with one program, the member automatically qualifies for the
other.
Under such an arrangement, UNAC can "piggyback" the UNAC
and federal rehabilitation loan monies thereby providing a
larger pool of money. Such an opportunity has three benefits.
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First, less desirable units can be redeveloped given that
members have deeper pockets. Second, deep subsidies can be
provided to low-income members to create a housing
opportunity. And third, UNAC can take advantage of and
promote the recent membership movement to purchase more
affordable single-family "fixer-uppers". Couple this with the
UNAC interest subsidies on federal rehabilitation loans and
such an effort could potentially reach very low-income
members.
The last option which provides real homeownership
opportunities is HOPE III. The main attractiveness of this
program is that it targets the disposition of single-family
residences to people with incomes at or below 80 percent of
the AMI with financing provided through the Homeownership
Trust. Since the Bush Administration has been touting HOPE as
a remedy to the "cycle of poverty", HOPE III will likely
receive considerable financial backing when appropriations are
made.20
Given this situation, UNAC should, as noted above, open a
dialogue with CHDOs emphasizing the virtues of their
homebuying counseling services and financial resources since
CHDOs will be the dominant recipients of such housing. UNAC
should likewise take pains to note how their financial and
counseling services, by increasing development capacity, can
20United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development. HOPE. (Washington D.C.: Office of Policy
Development and Research, November 1989) p. 1.
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be the key to securing planning and implementation grants. In
doing this, UNAC will be in a better position to request set-
asides, the purchase of which can ultimately be made more
affordable with HTF mortgage interest buydown, downpayment and
rehabilitation loan assistance.
115
Chapter 4
Leveraging HTF Monies with State & Local
Supply-Side Housing Programs
This chapter is similar to the previous in that it paves
a road for the weary traveler in identifying HTF leveraging
opportunities. Specifically, the programs are local and
state, affordable housing supply-side approaches that
complement UNAC's demand-side housing policies . These
programs include the following: the Boston Soft Second
Program; Community Investment Coalition Soft Second Program;
Mortgage Certificate Program; Acquisition Set-Aside Program
and the Neighborhood Rehabilitation Program. A description of
each program is provided followed by the role UNAC can play,
especially with regard to supplemental financing provided by
the HTF, in creating housing opportunities for members.
Introduction
The housing system in Massachusetts is made up of many
parts and people at all levels of government. Unfortunately,
there is no central location to seek assistance. This
decentralization coupled with the fact that there are not
enough housing resources to accommodate everyone's housing
needs, makes securing assistance frustrating. Thus, UNAC must
understand the ecology of housing subsidy programs so that
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they can educate their membership and secure housing
assistance opportunities for their membership.
Boston Soft-Second Program
One such affordable housing opportunity is the Boston
Soft Second Mortgage Program (BSS). Under this public-private
initiative, sponsored by the City of Boston and the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership, affordable housing
opportunities are expanded for low- and moderate-income
residents of Boston who earn below 80 percent of the AMI (see
Table 1). In an attempt to provide homeownership
opportunities to lower-income people BSS gives priority to
those participants who are below 70 percent of the AMI (see
Table 1), minority, handicapped or Vietnam-era veterans, and
are seeking to purchase a unit at a sales price (acquisition
cost) allowed under the program.1
'The maximum price for a condominium is $110,000.
Maximum price for a single family home and a two family home
are $125,000 and $145,000 respectively.
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Table 1
Standard Income Limits (80% of median income)
Household Size Income
1-4 $35,000
5 $37,900
6 $40, 100
7 $42,400
8 $43,000
Standard Income Limits (70% of median income)
Household Size Income
1-4 $31,238
5 $33, 163
6 $35,088
7 $37, 100
8 $37,625
Source: Executive Office of Communities and Development
Beyond the targeting requirements, the BSS program helps
first-time homebuyers qualify for a mortgage. In trying to
buy a home, a bank determines whether a person is qualified
based on the total amount to be mortgaged, the amount of
monthly payments, and the person's income. If the total
mortgage amount is high, monthly payments will be high, and a
person earning less than $35,700 annually may have trouble
qualifying for a loan under industry underwriting standards.
However, with a lower mortgage amount monthly debt service
payments will decrease thereby increasing the likelihood of
qualifying for a mortgage.
The BSS program addresses the smaller mortgage amount
issue by breaking the total mortgage amount into a first and
second mortgage. Lenders then qualify people based primarily
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on the first mortgage amount, which is now less, and a portion
of the interest on the second mortgage. Also, the cost burden
is reduced through a publicly subsidized mortgage insurance
program and a 5 percent downpayment.
The BSS program helps buyers by limiting their debt in
the early years of homeownership. Specifically, the buyer's
first mortgage is at a fixed, below market interest rate and
is fully amortizing with the second mortgage having the same
interest rate. However, to alleviate the buyer's financial
burden during the early years of ownership, the second
mortgage, through year 10 (on a 30 year mortgage) is non-
amortizing with public subsidies covering most of the interest
payment in early years (years 1-5). Thereafter the interest
rate increases less than 3 percent a year. In year 11, the
arrangement changes with the buyer making monthly payments on
principal and interest for the second mortgage with principal
payments gradually prorated over the remaining 20 years.2
These cost savings ease the financial burden and ultimately
assist the borrower in qualifying for a home mortgage.
Opportunities for UNAC Under BSS
UNAC has begun to use BSS with much success. In fact, a
preponderance of UNAC housing education assistance has gone
2Executive Office of Communities and Development, The
Boston Soft Second Loan Program, (Boston, MA: EOCD, November
19, 1990).
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toward helping members negotiate every aspect of the program
from the application and subsidy reservation to locating a
unit and obtaining a mortgage commitment from the lender.
Yet, according to UNAC staff this assistance largely goes to
moderate-income members while providing insufficient subsidies
to lower-income members. This is not to say that lower-income
members have not benefitted from the program; they have, but
UNAC staff are concerned that more could be done for those who
are below the program income thresholds.
UNAC's feelings and concerns are correct. Much more can
be done for lower-income members under the BSS program to
realize affordable homeownership. One key to providing such
opportunities is the supplemental financial assistance
available under the HTF.
Through the HTF interest subsidy program, the present
interest rate, which normally hovers around 5.5 percent, could
be written down further in the initial years for low-income
first-time homebuyers.3 Investing the HTF buydown monies in
such a manner will reduce the monthly debt service payment
thereby alleviating much of the cost burden in early years
which is important to low-income members.
This assistance is not a magical panacea that will simply
reduce the interest rate and thereby allow all members to
purchase a home. First, to bring mortgages into a range that
3Mortgage interest rate is at 8.25% with a subsidy loan
provided by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership bringing the
interest rate down ever further to 5.5%,
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are affordable to people with the- lowest-incomes requires deep
subsidies beyond the maximum buydown of $7,500. Second, the
buydown is not a grant, it is a loan. Thus, in addition to
paying monthly mortgage payments, the member must also repay
their HTF loan. This could prove financially burdensome and
reduce lower-income residents ability to either repay or
qualify for the mortgage. UNAC has realized this and
tentatively suggested that the buydown funds be recaptured
from sales proceeds after the member recoups his or her
initial investment, but before they receive the proscribed
limited appreciation. If UNAC holds to this policy, the
buydown may prove beneficial.
Although the buydown provides potential benefits, the HTF
downpayment assistance cannot replicate this to the same
extent. As it stands the BSS program requires a 5 percent
downpayment, which must come directly from the buyer. The
exception is that gift letters from family members can be used
toward the downpayment as long as the borrower puts in at
least half the downpayment using their own cash (i.e. 2.5%).
This stipulation nullifies any use of HTF downpayment
assistance if the buyer cannot produce a downpayment of 2.5
percent. However, if the buyer provides a downpayment in
excess of 2.5 percent the HTF downpayment funds could be used
to increase the downpayment and thereby lower the mortgage
amount and thus monthly debt payments.
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The opportunities available under the non-conforming loan
program are not as clear as those under the downpayment
assistance program. As mentioned in chapter 2, by insuring 20
percent of the mortgage the non-conforming loan program allows
members, whose financial conditions do not conform to standard
underwriting criteria, to qualify for a mortgage.
This does not fit well with the BSS program because the
underwriting criteria are already far more liberal than
conventional underwriting standards. Moreover, the
fruitfulness of such an endeavor is principally dependent on
the lender's discretion concerning how well the applicant
satisfies the underwriting criteria. Thus, providing non-
conforming loan assistance does not ensure receipt of a
mortgage nor does it necessarily override or ease underwriting
criteria.
The other concern under the non-conforming loan program
is whether members can accommodate the monthly risk premium
payment. As presently structured, the rate will be
approximately .24 percent of the monthly principle and
interest payment which translates into roughly $30 or $50 a
month depending on the rate and the loan amount. This may
prove difficult to meet given that these particular members'
financial means are already somewhat stretched by the mortgage
payment alone. If this payment could be deferred till sale or
delayed for the first 5 or 10 years of the mortgage, then the
122
financial strains on the buyer might be reduced and
homeownership opportunities provided for more members.
Community Investment Coalition Soft-Second Program (CIC)
The CIC program, which is similar to BSS, was developed
through the efforts of the neighborhood-based, Massachusetts
Affordable Housing Alliance (MAHA) that formed after studies
had shown a pattern of racial discrimination in mortgage
lending by many Boston Banks.4 After receiving a $2 million
commitment from the state to cure such ills, MAHA leveraged
further commitments from Bay Bank, Bank of Boston and Shawmut
Bank totaling $15 million.' The program in concept and
structure is very similar to the BSS program with a few
detractions and added perks.
The money in this program is slated to provide fixed-rate
mortgages at a 6.5 percent interest rate to homebuyers with
incomes ranging from $15,000 to $43,000.6 Specifically,
buyers pay an interest rate of 6.5 percent for the first five
years. Then, for the following five years, the monthly
payment is adjusted yearly with increases of $15 to $30 a
month. Thereafter, in year 11, payments stay fixed at a below
4David Walker, "New Program Can Assist New Buyers with
Financing," Boston Globe, February 2, 1991, p. 41.
5Ibid p. 41.
6Ibid
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market rate for the remaining 20 -years of the loan.7 The
banks involved with the program have agreed to accept a 5
percent downpayment. For those buyers unable to furnish a 5
percent downpayment, the city of Boston has set up a fund to
cover 2 percent. No points or mortgage fees are required, the
home expense to income and payment to income ratios are a
liberal 33 and 38 percent respectively and a discounted
mortgage insurance package is provided through the city and
state.
Opportunities Under CIC
Although the CIC program is only able to provide mortgage
assistance to a small number of homebuyers, UNAC has already
facilitated home purchases for a few members under this
program. The income ranges serve to complement the income
characteristics of UNAC and allow members to purchase
moderately priced homes (see. Table 2).
Table 2
Income Maximum Home Price
$22,000 $70,000
$25,000 $80,000
$28,000 $90,000
$31,000 $100,000
$28,000 (2 family home) $175,000
Source: MAMA
7Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance Home Buyers
Union, "Home Buyers Union Affordable Mortgage Plan," (Boston,
MA: MAHA, April 1, 1991.
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Moreover these home purchase price and income guidelines
provide an abundance of affordable homeownership opportunities
to UNAC members. But, as with the BSS program, more
homeownership opportunities could be made, particularly to
lower income members who need deeper subsidies, if CIC were
used in concert with the HTF monies.
Such an opportunity occurs through the HTF interest
subsidy program which could be used to write down the below-
market interest rate further. Given the present structure of
the HTF buydown program, the interest rate could be reduced to
4.5 percent in the first two years, 5.5 in years 3 and 4 and
in year 5 to 5.75 percent with the year 6 interest subject to
a .75 HTF buydown. This buydown scheme could also lower debt
ratios in the initial years and thereby possibly improve the
borrowers ability to receive a mortgage. Again, if UNAC
requires payment of these funds at sale then this program
could provide a considerable boon to homeownership efforts for
UNAC members. However if it sticks to monthly payments this
might put a strain on lower-incomes and reduce affordable
housing opportunities.
The CIC downpayment requirement provides benefits similar
to the buydown when used in conjunction with HTF downpayment
assistance. Although CIC requires a minimum personal
downpayment contribution of 3 percent, with no family gifts
allowed, the HTF monies can increase the down payment beyond 3
percent and thereby improve the members chance of being
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selected for funding. This is important especially
considering that lenders are presently reluctant to "provide a
mortgage with less than 3 percent.. .in a declining market
where homeowners can maximize their wealth by walking away
from the property." 8
The opportunities available under the HTF downpayment
assistance program do not translate as easily for the HTF non-
conforming loan program. As presently structured, the CIC
program provides the most liberal underwriting standards in
the state and any attempt to liberalize them further, even
with mortgage insurance seems visionary. Moreover, the added
burden of paying the monthly mortgage insurance premium under
the HTF non-conforming loan program might make lenders weary
of approving a mortgage given the added strain it places on
income.
Unfortunately, many of the apparent benefits under CIC
are lost to the Boston locational requirement. For low-income
people, trying to find an affordable home price usually means
living in Roxbury, Mattapan or Dorchester. However, according
to UNAC staff member Carol Ridge, "people don't want to live
in those areas." In fact, purchases in this area are
infrequent. This reality severely limits the benefits of this
program. Thus, UNAC must work to both find affordable housing
8Michael A. Stegman, "The Case for Low-Income
Homeownership," Presentation at Conference sponsored by
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials,
San Antonio, Texas. July 29, 1990. p. 7.
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opportunities elsewhere in the city and attempt to change
members' perceptions about these areas.
Mortgage Certificate Program
The MHFA-sponsored Mortgage Certificate Program (MCC)
differs from the BSS and CIC programs in that it is not a loan
program, but a federal tax credit program that is designed to
"help lower-income borrowers make more of their income
available for mortgage payments." 9 Under the MCC program a
buyer can subtract 20 percent of the interest paid on a
mortgage each year directly from the bottom-line of the taxes
they owe which may represent net additional income for the
buyer. In fact, this income may be necessary to qualify for a
loan.
The general requirements of the program stipulate that
buyers must have an income below $35,700 in the Boston
metropolitan area and $33,800 for the balance of the state.
Home price (acquisition cost) limits vary from a low of
$130,000 for a single-family new construction condominium to
$253,000 for a four family existing house; sufficiently within
the range of home prices many UNAC members can afford.
The following table (Table 3) illustrates how MCCs can
create homebuying opportunities particularly when combined
9Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Information,
(Boston, MA: MHFA, January 1991).
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with less restrictive underwriting standards. In case I, a
housing expense to income ratio of .28 is considered along
with a conventional mortgage at 10 percent and an LTV ratio of
.95. Case II is the same except an MCC is considered. Case
III, looks at the impact of both lowering the housing expense
to income ratio to .33 in addition to using the MCC. Under
each scenario, as the MCC is used with less restrictive
underwriting criteria, the qualifying income decreases thereby
providing homeownership opportunities to lower-income members.
Table 3
Case I Case II Case III
Price $85,000 $85,000 $85,000
Downpayment* $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
Mortgage $80,000 $80,000 $80,000
Total PITI** $876.06 $876.06 $876.06
Monthly MCC
Value 0 ($133) ($133)
Adjusted ***
PITI $877.06 $744.06 $744.06
Required
Income $37,500 $31,900 $27,000
* actual downpayment amounts may vary depending on the type of mortgage
obtained and the
lender providing the mortgage.
** PITI = monthly principal, interest, taxes and insurance
***PITI adjustments will vary depending on the loan program of the lender.
Source: MHFA
Opportunities Under MCC
Since the MCCs are not loans, the HTF monies cannot be
directly used in conjunction with them to increase
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affordability. However, they can-be used in tandem with any
conventional or government-backed mortgage, excluding the low-
interest mortgages provided through MHFA.10
Given this structure, UNAC can "piggyback" the MCCs with
either the ICC or BSS soft second programs thereby reducing
mortgage costs and providing assistance to lower-income
households. In fact, UNAC has used the MCCs with both of
these programs and according to UNAC staff member Carol Ridge
"combining the CIC with the MCC decreases the effective
interest rate (out of pocket) to as low as 5.5 percent. So,
if you adjust your federal income tax forms (W-4) so that you
realize the credit in the form of more take-home pay each
month you increase your cash flow which may allow you to
qualify for a mortgage at a lower effective interest rate."
However, her one reservation about MCC was that it does not
benefit lower-income members because their incomes are
sufficiently low so that they pay little in the form of taxes
and thus receive minimal credit. Regardless, there is still
great potential in making the MCCs more beneficial when used
in concert with the CIC or BSS programs and the HTF monies.
The HTF interest subsidy program provides the largest
benefit to the MCC when used in conjunction with CIC or BSS.
Under such a coordinated program, the effective interest rate
of 5.5 percent could conceivably be written down further with
'Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Mortgage Credit
Certificate Program, Office of Single-Family Programs, April
1990.
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the $7,500 maximum buydown to as low as 3.5-4.5 percent for
the first 5 years of the mortgage. This would allow more low-
income members to qualify for mortgages given that lenders are
provided with proof of HTF financial assistance prior to
mortgage selection.
As with both the BSS and CIC program, the benefits of
providing downpayment assistance are not clear. At the
minimum the buyer must provide at least 2.5% of the requisite
5 percent downpayment. UNAC could attempt to change such
policy, but it is doubtful this will prove beneficial given
that lenders want borrowers to put some equity into the deal
so that risk is shared.
The HTF non-conforming loan program similarly provides
little benefit to UNAC members. Although the private mortgage
insurance guarantees 20 percent of each mortgage against loss
in instances of foreclosure or default, a request to
liberalize mortgage underwriting standards on a spot basis
under CIC or BSS seems futile given that debt standards have
been liberalized beyond industry standards.
Acquisition Set-Aside Program (ASAP)
The ASAP program, which is MHFA's most recent response to
the declining New England real estate market, provides
significantly more benefits for UNAC members than MCC. Under
ASAP, homeownership opportunities for low- and moderate-income
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people are promoted through sales- incentives to developers who
may be having difficulty selling their units. By reducing
prices on newly constructed units, developers can become
eligible for a reservation of MHFA low-interest mortgages
provided to homebuyers solely purchasing in their development.
According to MHFA, "this not only promotes a quicker sellout,
but provides affordable housing opportunities for low- and
moderate-income households.""
The ASAP program requirements more clearly illustrate the
program's benefits. First, the maximum home purchase price
and income limits are $130,000 and $38,000 respectively."
Second, for people earning below $35,700 a Graduated Payment
Mortgage at 6 percent is available. This mortgage increases
gradually over the first 7 years until it reaches the rate of
8.25 percent in year 8 where it remains fixed for the balance
of the mortgage. More moderate-income homebuyers (i.e.
incomes greater than $35,700) are eligible for a 30 year fixed
rate mortgage at 8.25 percent. The underwriting standards
include more strict debt ratios of 30 and 36 percent, an LTV
ratio of 95 percent and reduced closing cost. Third, all
units must contain a minimum living space of 700 square feet
and at least one bedroom. Fourth, all mortgage loans with
LTVs in excess of 75 percent of the unit's actual sales price
"Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Information,
(Boston, MA: March 1991) p. 5.
12For a two or larger person household the maximum income
is $43,000.
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are required to carry mortgage insurance in amounts ranging
from 35 percent for LTV ratios between 90-95 percent to 20
percent for LTV between 75-80 percent . Lastly, an added
perk to the program is that once the sales prices have been
established by the lender and developer, if half the ASAP
units remain unsold for 90 days, a previously negotiated
discount on the sales price -- between 5 and 10 percent --
takes effect.
Opportunities Under ASAP
ASAP has been touted as MHFA's most effective supply-side
affordable housing mitigation policy. Recent improvements to
the program allowing for financing of cooperative units and
condominiums, a streamlined review process on project
selection and below market mortgage financing has made this
program much more cost-effective for developers and homebuyers
alike.
Up till the beginning of March 1991 when policy changes
were made, the use of ASAP had been sparse, however UNAC
should, in light of the recent policy changes, position itself
to take advantage of this program." The opportunities that
13Mortgage insurance on all mortgage loans must remain in
force until the amount of the mortgage loan is reduced to 75%
of the original value of the property at closing date.
14According to staff members at MHFA ASAP was not
publicized well last year. But, the program has taken off
with the recent changes and increased advertising.
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exist under this program, are quite similar to the ones listed
under earlier programs, however, ASAP shifts the
responsibility away from the homebuyer to the developer. That
is, homebuyers do not complete the leg work of locating and
financing a unit, rather, developers submit an application for
a set-aside of below-market rate financing for their
developments with MHFA publicly listing the housing
opportunity.
This sounds attractive as it stands, but it can be made
more so if used in tandem with the HTF program. At present,
ASAP provides for an interest rate as low as 6 percent and at
a maximum of 8.25 percent. If used in conjunction with the
HTF buydown each of these interest rates could be written down
further for the initial years of the mortgage thus reducing
the payment burden as borrowers presumably build wealth. 5
The ASAP downpayment requirement provides limited
opportunities for leveraging HTF downpayment assistance.
Specifically, 2.5 of the required 5 percent downpayment must
come from the applicant's own funds with the other 2.5 percent
allowed "in the form of a gift from an immediate family
member."'6 Although this may seem attractive ASAP guidelines
indicate that a 5 percent downpayment will be rare and more
likely be "10 percent or higher when the acquisition cost is
15The MCC cannot be used in conjunction with the ASAP
program since it is operated through MHFA.
"
6Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Revised ASAP
Guidelines and Application Package, (Boston, MA: March 1991)
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at or above $110,000.""1 This does not mean a 2.5 percent
downpayment, is impermissible, but rather, to be competitive
for financing members must put up larger amounts so lenders
will approve their mortgage. Still under either scenario a
member can improve the probability of receiving a mortgage by
using the HTF downpayment program to augment their total
downpayment amount.
The non-conforming loan requirements follow the same sort
of logic as that under the downpayment program. That is, the
debt ratios are only guidelines; it is ultimately up to the
lender's to assume more liberal underwriting standards.
Additionally, the 30 percent home expense to income ratio and
the 36 percent income to expense ratio are strictly applied,
thus providing little opportunity for utilizing the HTF non-
conforming loan program.
All the ASAP benefits, whether provided with HTF
assistance or not, can be used in concert with the 5 to 10
percent discounting process that occurs when half the ASAP
units in a development remain unsold for 90 days. Such a
condition provides a critical affordable housing opportunity
especially considering that home "sitting" periods have
increased drastically with the downturn in the New England
real estate market. This not only provides a benefit to the
buyer through a reduced price, it provides a benefit to the
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developer by increasing the likel-ihood that the unit will be
sold.
Neighborhood Revitalization Program (NRP)
NRP, which is sponsored by MHFA, is different from ASAP's
in that it focuses on the rehabilitation of existing homes to
help revitalize older neighborhoods in communities throughout
the state. Although NRP is currently inactive due to cuts in
the states budget, the potential for affordable housing
benefits is present given that staff at MHFA believe it will
be up and running during the summer 1991.
NRP is essentially a two-pronged program which provides
interested buyers below-market mortgages so that they may buy
and fix up a home. The first component of the program is for
standard rehabilitation in which the purchaser buys a home
that requires at least $3,000 of rehabilitation (more for a
two family residence) in a locally designated area. 8 The
annualized income limits with regard to location are the same
as under ASAP as are the acquisition cost limits, which must
be equal to the purchase price of the property plus the cost
of rehabilitation. The second component of the program,
termed "qualified rehabilitation", targets funds and
financing, under the same restrictions, to owner-occupants of
18These locally designated areas called Areas of Chronic
Economic Distress, include Boston, Chelsea, Everett, Fall
River, Lynn, North Adams and Sommerville.
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one to four family homes in need -of substantial
rehabilitation. The difference under NRP as opposed to ASAP
is that the total mortgage amount cannot exceed 95 percent of
the previous acquisition cost limits or the estimated
appraised value of the property after rehabilitation, which
ever is less.
Opportunities Under NRP
Since the basic structure of NRP is the same as ASAP, the
benefits of using the interest subsidy, non-conforming loan
and downpayment assistance under HTF will be similar. Yet,
NRP is different in that its value is augmented through the
HTF rehabilitation program.
The potential benefits provided through the interest
subsidy and downpayment programs are a function of the lenders
willingness to accept the minimum program underwriting
standards. Although a 2.5 percent downpayments are
permissible, it seems rare that a lender would provide such a
mortgage if there are other income-eligible tenants with
larger downpayments. One way for UNAC member to make members
more attractive is to use HTF monies to increase their
downpayment amount thereby making them more attractive to
potential lenders. Buydowns could also provide benefits to
the members through lower initial debt service payments as
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long as the burden of paying them- off is deferred till a time
when a member is more financially solvent, like at sale.
Where definite opportunity does exist is under the HTF
rehabilitation program. Under this program, member are
supplied with financing to purchase and renovate their home in
locally designated areas , all of which are contained under
NRP, if they qualify for the mortgage through the regular NRP
process. Once the loan is secured, UNAC then supplies up to
$5,000 in rehabilitation funds as a non-interest bearing
permanent recapture loan. This money may be used to make
further improvements to the home under the standard program or
indirectly used to help members meet debt service payments in
early or late years. Under the NRP qualified rehabilitation
component, if money is needed beyond the acquisition cost
limit or estimated appraised value, whatever the case, then
the HTF rehabilitation funds can be used to provide additional
financing. Under either scenario, the program serves to take
advantage of the low prices and member preference that has
occurred through increased foreclosure and property
deterioration in recent years.
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Table-1
Overview of Housing Opportunities
Summary: Issues and Strategy
The fiscal debacle in Massachusetts has significantly
reduced housing subsidy programs offered by the state. The
affordable housing production programs created by the Dukakis
administration have been curtailed and replaced with clearly
under funded supply-side housing programs. What this means
for UNAC is that they must work harder and quicker to locate
and secure the "scraps" that are left. Moving in this
direction requires UNAC to focus its energies on a few of the
above government programs while altering its housing program
so that it better complements them.
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Program I Features and Opportunities
BSS Soft second mortgage program qualifies people on lower first
mortgage amount; limits debt in early years through public
subsidies with interest rate at 5.5%. HTF buydown and
downpayment assistance makes program more affordable thereby
reaching lower-income members.
CIC Similar to the above, but with interest rate of 6.5%. Program
made more affordable with HTF assistance.
MCC Provides tax credits that can be used in tandem with below
mortgage financing (i.e. CIC & BSS) to bring down effective
interest rate.
ASAP Developers reduce sales price on newly constructed units in
exchange for a reservation of graduated, low-interest
mortgages. HTF makes program more affordable through
downpayment and interest buydown assistance.
NRP Targets money to the rehab of homes in the same communities as
HTF rehab program; Below market mortgages are provided throgh
MHFA and UNAC that can be used to encourage recent trend to fix
up older reseidneces.
The ASAP program, which according to MHFA, primarily
benefits "high-low-income wage earners and moderate-income
people" (i.e. those with incomes between $38,000-$30,000),
will bear benefits for UNAC members if provided to more
financially secure members. That is, ASAP, under present
circumstances, will be best suited to members who have both
incomes around $30,000 and a sizeable savings that can be
applied to the downpayment. HTF assistance, if combined with
this benefit, can be extended to lower-income emembers. A
good number of low-income members could probably come close to
meeting the minimum ASAP program requirements. But, meeting
the minimum does not make one competitive in the selection
process. Rather, lenders are more willing to provide
mortgages to people who have higher incomes or larger
downpayments because these individuals are less likely to
default on their loans. Taking this cue, UNAC should increase
HTF assistance, especially if lower-income members are going
to be helped.
As it stands, roughly a third of the membership have
savings of $5,000, but this does not even equal half the 10
percent downpayment necessary on a purchase of a $130,000
home.'9 Since the HTF maximum downpayment assistance is
$5,000, the member still falls short by $3,000. However, if
UNAC were to increase the maximum downpayment amount to $8,000
"As noted earlier, 5% percent downpayments will rarely
be accepted under the ASAP program.
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or $10,000 more members could be-competitive under ASAP.
Thus, UNAC should move quickly to activate this assistance at
the increased amount so that it may realize these benefits on
this temporary program.
To further secure opportunities under ASAP, UNAC should
redesign its payback methods. As has been noted, providing
supplemental financial assistance through the HTF is key in
helping lower-income members take advantage of moderately-
income designed programs. However, UNAC must be sure not to,
in an attempt to provide assistance, further cost burden
members by requiring paybacks in early years. To avoid such a
problem, UNAC should implement its policy of recapturing funds
from sales proceeds, after the member recoups his or her
personal investment, but before receiving the proscribed
limited appreciation. In doing this, UNAC will facilitate the
homebuying process for more members.
The BSS program, which has greater financial backing and
therefore more longevity than CIC, can be made more beneficial
to members if UNAC makes similar policy changes to its housing
program as those suggested under ASAP.
As presently structured, the BSS provides a mortgage
interest rate, in the initial years, of 5.5 percent. When
this is combined with the MCC and HTF interest buydown or
downpayment assistance, the potential members who qualify is
increased. But, the HTF assistance, as it is structured, is
insufficient to make mortgages available to lower-income
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people. Thus, UNAC should increase the amount of assistance
provided under both of these programs to low-income persons so
that those who are excluded under ASAP can find an affordable
unit on their own. Specifically, maximum assistance under
these programs should be increased somewhere between $8,000-
$10,000. These amounts are small enough that assistance can
be provided and recycled to many people, but large enough to
make low-income members financially attractive to lenders.
If such a policy is to be made useful, UNAC must also
alter its repayment policy so that members are not financially
strapped in early years. UNAC can accomplish this by
requiring paybacks after sale of the unit or upon a drastic
increase in the members financial situation.
Although the above policy changes require greater
financial subsidies by UNAC, and thus, a reduction in the
number of members that can be assisted, UNAC must make this
trade-off so that it can take advantage of these recent and
temporary housing assistance programs. Failing to do so will
allow housing opportunities to pass members by and this is
something UNAC cannot afford.
141
Chapter 5
Conclusion: Issues to be Resolved
Unions have been involved in the housing development
field for over sixty years, but no union has attempted to do
what Local 26 is proposing: to use employer, union pension
and public resources to create housing opportunities for union
members. Although it is apparent that UNAC can play an
important role in providing housing opportunities for its
membership, UNAC can be assured it will face many legal,
political and economic challenges in its efforts to fully
realize the benefits of the new and innovative employer-
assisted HTF.
First, the establishment of UNAC and the proposed HTF
program will bring a new entity into community development;
the local union. For much of community development history,
players in this movement have defined themselves
geographically, often times by race, but never according to
place of employment. Thus, in the short run, unions will
likely face political challenges in trying to be included into
the community development field. Second, the union has to
confront the problematic issue of allocating this scarce and
admittedly small HTF resource among members who have quite
divergent incomes, housing needs and competing interest.
Lastly, much of the UNAC housing program is based on
assumptions that lenders, brokers, and UNAC members will fully
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cooperate and accept the proposed-housing program
arrangements, but this has not been tested nor have any
commitments from key players been secured. All of these
issues, if not addressed and worked through, stand as
potential road blocks to UNAC's full realization of housing
opportunities for its membership.
A New Player in Community Development: UNAC
The community development movement, and community housing
development organizations (CHDO) in particular, have
historically defined themselves geographically and sometimes
according to race, but UNAC is trying to broaden this
definition to include the workplace. In trying to incorporate
this new dimension into the community development movement,
UNAC will have to struggle to re-define the rules of the
community development game with the reward being that such a
redefinition can potentially strengthen both the labor and
community development movements.'
As chapter 3 indicates, if UNAC is to benefit from much
of the recent federal housing legislation it will have to seek
set-asides through its partnerships with community housing
development organizations. But, such an arrangement must be
'Jean Kluver, From Work to Home: Boston's Hotel Workers
and the Prospects for Union-Sponsored Housing. MIT Masters
Thesis, 1988, p. 48.
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done within the context of a political and legal environment
that has never been traversed.2
CHDOs sometimes build housing in conjunction with
community service organizations, philanthropic organizations
and other CHDOs. The goal under each arrangement is to
provide housing at a price that is affordable to community,
city or town residents on either a first come first serve
basis or according to a lottery. Yet, UNAC proposes to change
this arrangement by having housing units set-aside for their
membership in exchange for financial assistance to the group
or organization developing the housing.
Such an arrangement faces two separate legal issues.
First, any developer of publicly subsidized housing must
follow an affirmative marketing plan to ensure that residents
are a racially balanced group. Although this may not seem
like a problem, Boston has been torn with racial strife,
especially in developments located in South Boston that have
excluded people of color. Second, the use of public funds in
a project requires that the development be equally accessible
to all people, thus UNAC's attempt at having funds allocated
to a development that is partially reserved for their
membership is problematic.
UNAC can mitigate and possibly eliminate both of these
potential legal challenges. First, the UNAC membership is
racially and ethnically diverse, thus affirmative marketing
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2 Ibid. p. 48.
requirements may not be a problem-. Specifically, 75 percent
of the respondents surveyed in the Local 26 Housing Needs
Assessment Study were people of color. Second, since many
UNAC members earn less than 80-50 percent of the AMI and 78
percent of members are eligible for section 8 assistance this
group is eligible for much of the federal, state and local
housing assistance. While allocating public subsidies to a
specific group may elicit dissent among observers, if such a
group is fully eligible and has been unable to gain access to
public assistance through other means, officials and
administrators may become more receptive to the set-aside
issue.'
UNAC will also face challenges in being recognized as a
credible housing player. In 1985, the International was
identified by the President's Commission on Organized Crime to
be "one of the big four" unions believed to be substantially
controlled by organized crime. 4 Although mob control of
locals has been impeded by the tradition of autonomy inherited
by the locals, such connections may hurt UNAC's image as a
credible community services organization. Moreover, there is
no assurance that CHDOs will even permit set-asides to UNAC.
In fact, Local 26 has eroded much of UNAC's vital alliances
'Ibid. p. 49.
4Betsy Aron, Mobilizing Strategies in Times of
Transition, Local 26: A Case Study of Participation and
Power. Unpublished Paper, Department of Political Science,
Brandeis University, 1991, p 24.
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with community-based organizations and the City with their
political support of the "no new taxes" platform supported by
the conservative Citizens for Limited Taxation.
Some of the legal and political problems noted above
result from the fact that few local unions have been involved
in the community development field. UNAC will have to
redefine this past which has been shaped by twenty years of a
community development movement in which unions have been
absent. While such a departure will assuredly entail
political haggling, it may lead to UNAC's acceptance in the
end.
UNAC represents a large constituency that is in need of
housing assistance and brings into this field financial
resources, in the form of employer contributions, which are
new to this movement. While there is no guarantee that UNAC's
inclusion into the housing and community development field
will prove easy, it will open the door for other like-minded
unions to become involved in community development.
Hopefully, this will create a partnership of greater resource
sharing and cooperation between the community development and
labor movements.
5Jean Kluver, From Work to Home: Boston's Hotel Workers
and the Prospects for Union-Sponsored Housing. MIT, Masters
Thesis, 1988, p. 40.
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Distributing a Scarce Resource
Beyond the formidable task of redefining the players and
notion of community development, UNAC must construct a
criteria for distributing the scarce HTF resource. This is
particularly difficult in UNAC's case given the disparity in
wealth and housing conditions between workers, the limited
size of the HTF, and the compelling legal requirement that any
negotiated trust benefit must represent the interest of all
union members.
UNAC has taken the initial approach of targeting HTF
assistance to the lowest-income workers. However, from an
implementation perspective, targeting assistance to the
lowest-income poses numerous operational challenges. Where
should the line be drawn below which households are eligible
to receive assistance: 30 percent of median income, 50
percent of median income or some other percentage of median
income? Should there be some leeway in making these
determinations or should the individual or family be excluded
from receiving assistance once they reach a specified
threshold? How are members to be selected for funding when
there are numerous others who face equally egregious housing
situations? How can UNAC factor in the physical condition of
existing housing and the percentage of income paid for current
housing expenses into a determination of which eligible
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households receive assistance?6 UNAC has considered these
issues in developing its distributional criteria, but has yet
to take the more difficult step of determining how to
incorporate these variables into a criteria that operates in a
systematic, defined and routinized way.
From a political perspective, providing assistance to the
lowest-income will undoubtedly ruffle some feathers.
Expecting workers of all incomes to contribute to a fund,
while providing assistance to a specific group, not only cuts
against issues of feasibility, it violates the "sole and
exclusive" clause under existing labor law which is meant to
ensure that employee benefits are fairly distributed among all
contributing employees. 7 This condition will assuredly catch
the eye of higher income workers, who will oppose any
distributional policy that does not provide them equal access
to HTF monies. This targeting policy will not only make the
UNAC housing program difficult to implement, it will run the
risk of excluding households that do need housing assistance,
and as such, will generate a weak and vulnerable political
constituency.
Directing assistance to the lower-income members,
although attractive on moral grounds, may not be the most
'Langley Keyes and Denise DiPasquale, Housing Policy for
the 1990s, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Housing Project, 1988) p. 10.
7David Nash, Housing Benefits Under Existing Labor Law,
(New Brunswick, NJ: The American Affordable Housing
Institute, 1988) p. 4.
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inviting policy on practical grounds. The HTF only amounts to
$1.5 million, yet UNAC must distribute this money with an eye
on the interest of all 5,000 members. This poses a perplexing
issue given that almost all members are in need or could
benefit from some type of housing assistance. Thus, the
question arises: Is it possible to meet all members' housing
needs with such a small pot of money while simultaneously
directing assistance to the lowest-income?
Two examples will shed light on an answer to such a
question. Suppose 200 low-income members (or 4% of
membership), having incomes below 70 percent of the median
income, seek interest subsidies at the maximum amount of
$7,500. At this rate the HTF would be depleted in one year.
Or, suppose a 100 members seek buydown funds at the maximum
amount and another 100 seek rehabilitation funds at $5,000.
Under such a scenario there will only be $250,000 left in the
HTF after year 1. Although not completely exhausted, there
would still be people in need of rental guarantees and
downpayment assistance.
This predicament poses two additional problems. First,
there needs to be money on hand in the HTF so that other
assistance can be provided. Second, funds also need to be
recycled to keep the HTF operative. However, under the first
example funds would be depleted after a year and under the
second example funds would be severely diminished thereby
offering future members less housing opportunities.
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It is no surprise that the HTF cannot meet the needs of
all 5,000 members. However, UNAC must ask itself whether the
goal is to serve the most members with limited subsidies, or
provide assistance to the poorest members with potentially
large subsidies. Under the present UNAC housing policies, the
only form of assistance that creates a housing opportunity
that reaches very low-income workers is the rental guarantee.
However, in some instances workers will not have enough income
to even meet the monthly rent on a consistent basis. For
example, if a worker earns $12,000 a year she can afford a
monthly rent of $300 based on the 30 percent of income federal
bench mark. Locating such a low rent is unlikely as is
receiving section 8 assistance (something which UNAC has no
control over), but UNAC makes no provisions for such a housing
situation. Thus, although UNAC has good intentions in
providing assistance to the neediest, and granted it can
assist in creating housing opportunities for many members, it
has yet to reconcile the issue of providing assistance to the
lowest-income worker while keeping an eye toward the financial
and legal constraints of the HTF.
Although the HTF, as noted by the previous discussion,
cannot be seen as a cure-all to members' housing ills it has
been, in some instances, as a such. However, this stance, as
can be seen, is neither realistic or true. In the housing
development field $1.5 million is pennies, especially when the
objective is to build housing. However, UNAC has backed away
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from envisioning itself as a housing developer. As noted by
the President of Local 26, Dominic Buzzotto: "We once had
great visions of building housing for our members through
UNAC, but now it's just a dream... .We don't ever want to get
into the landlord business." Although incapable of solving
all the members housing problems, the HTF can make headway
toward providing gap financing that can be the difference
between an apartment and homeownership and homlessness and
shelter.
Problems with UNAC Housing Program
The limitations of the HTF extend beyond the distributive
policy to UNAC's Housing Program. Although much of the
policies have been conceptually defined and outlined,
commitments from lenders, brokers and even UNAC members to
participate in such a program have not been thoroughly secured
or researched.
The Rental Assistance Program, although attractive in
concept, has yet to secure critical commitments from the
cornerstones of this program -- landlords and bankers. As the
guarantee is structured, a bank is to service the HTF by
establishing a collective bank account that will cover first
and last months rent plus security deposit. In lieu of actual
money, a legal certificate supplied by the HTF guarantees
payment to the landlord. As of yet, UNAC has not contracted
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with a bank to service the collective bank account. More
importantly however, UNAC is uncertain as to whether landlords
will accept a legal certificate guaranteeing move-in cost. In
fact, UNAC has made no connections with landlords on this
issue nor has it begun to delve into any research that will
elicit an answer or response to such a concern.
Assuming that landlords will accept a legal certificate
guaranteeing funds requires a quantum leap in faith on behalf
of the landlords. History has shown landlords reluctance to
accept anything but cash. The federal government has
guaranteed payment on a portion of rent through housing
vouchers and certificates, yet these government-backed notes
have often shunned by landlords who do not want to deal with
the transaction time of receiving payment. Although UNAC is
not a mammoth bureaucratic mess like the federal government,
it does require a 30 day waiting period before disbursal of
funds if damages are incurred. But, there is no compelling
reason for a landlord to accept such an arrangement when he or
she can have the funds in their own bank account, thereby
eliminating any waiting period.
The Guaranteed Lease-Up, Mortgage Interest Rate Subsidy
and Downpayment Assistance programs all pose similar problems
as those noted above. Specifically, the lease-up program is
attractive in a declining real estate market in which vacancy
rates are high and absorption rates are low. By supplying a
limited guarantee (covers 3 months rent) on lease-up for three
152
years, landlords presumably stand-to benefit, even if rents
are reduced in exchange for such a guarantee. However, no
attempt has been made by UNAC to ascertain, through
discussions with landlords, whether such a policy is
acceptable to area landlords. Since people inherently
distrust anything that deviates from common practice or is
new, there is no certainty as to whether such a program will
be welcomed by landlords, especially considering that they
must reduce their rents through a program that has no track
record.
The Mortgage Interest Rate Subsidy program also lacks a
key commitment. Under this program, UNAC issues a certificate
symbolizing that the HTF money has been committed to a
participant which is then transferred monthly to a buydown
account held in a bank. However, UNAC has yet to secure a
bank that will either accept such a certificate or service
such an account. This does not mean UNAC cannot secure an
arrangement -- it probably can -- rather, it has failed to so
thus far.
Similarly, UNAC is still in the "dark" with regard to
commitments for the Downpayment Assistance program. Under
this program, members are required to make monthly
contributions into an interest-bearing bank account through
automatic checking account or payroll deductions. Once the
requisite amount is saved with HTF and personal contributions,
the member receives a diploma certifying that they have a
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certain amount of money which they then present to real estate
brokers to show that they are financially capable of
purchasing a home. The only shortcoming under such an
arrangement is that UNAC is not certain that brokers will
accept the diploma as a legitimate, committed source of money.
They have neither researched this issue nor solicited the
opinions of local brokers. Moreover, UNAC has yet to arrange
a contract with a bank to service the interest-bearing bank
account. Although some of these issues may seem petty, they
are necessary cogs in the program machinery.
As with other programs, the Non-Conforming Loan program,
contains great ideas and possibly realizable goals, but UNAC
has not substantiated the commitments of any of the players
that are necessary for the program's functioning. Under this
program, HTF monies are used to purchase private mortgage
insurance (PMI) which guarantees 20 percent of the mortgage
for foreclosure and default on loans which do not conform to
standard underwriting criteria. Thereafter, the bank will let
the loans season; ultimately taking on the total mortgage
risk.
Although this sounds great for UNAC, there is no
guarantee, that a bank will agree to such an arrangement,
especially in a period of high defaults, depreciation in
housing prices and low job security for members who work in a
highly cyclical job market. Moreover, there is no guarantee
that member's will accept the required PMI risk premium
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payment nor is there certainty that they can cover such an
expense with their already tight budgets.
Two key elements that are attached to all the UNAC
homeownership programs are the limited equity restrictions on
price appreciation and the UNAC right of fist refusal to by
property. Both of these elements sound marvelous in that they
ensure permanent affordable housing for future members.
However, UNAC has overlooked a critical question: Will
lenders and buyers go along with such a program?
By attaching an appreciation restriction on the sales
price of a home, UNAC is asking members to forgo probably the
largest wealth generating investment of their lifetime. For
many members, this will represent both their largest
investment and close to all their personal wealth. Thus,
preventing them from fully realizing this benefit may prove
problematic. Similarly, lenders will not be fond of such an
arrangement limiting sales price appreciation especially if
they take over ownership as ~a result of default or
foreclosure. Giving members first dibs on purchase of
property may also prove troublesome to lenders and buyers.
Members who want to sell their homes will have to wait a
maximum of three months so UNAC can locate a qualified buyer
from the membership. However, requiring such a waiting period
when members are pressed to sell their home because of other
financial commitments, may prove unpalatable to some members.
Likewise, lenders may not accept such an arrangement that
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extends the selling period and further puts off recapture of
mortgage funds.
Although some of the above problems and concerns may seem
trite, the inability of UNAC to secure some of these
arrangements can impede the success of the housing program.
Thus, UNAC must concentrate on smoothing out the logistics and
commitments from the many players so that housing
opportunities can be forthcoming.
Union Involvement in Housing
It is obvious from the above discussion that Local 26's
HTF cannot meet every members housing needs. But, this does
not mean should UNAC renege on providing housing assistance to
members. Rather, Local 26 should pursue its vision of
providing workers housing as an employment benefit. As it
stands, many workers, especially the newly arrived immigrants,
distrust government and are ~therefore reluctant to seek
housing assistance from CHDOs, government agencies or
community service organizations. Thus, if hotel employers
want to retain a service-sector workforce and local union
leadership wants to be responsive to workers needs, it seems
not only logical, but compelling that management and unions
come together to work toward a solution.
Engaging in such an endeavor, on a broad scale, can
rejuvenate affordable housing development by bringing in new
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sources of financing. As illustrated in this thesis, unions
can create a housing resource by negotiating with employers
over a housing benefit. Another approach, although more
problematic, is to seek pension fund investment in affordable
housing. As it stands, most pension funds have gone untapped
due to strict requirements for high-yield returns and long-
term financial stability. This trend has excluded investment
in affordable housing. Fortunately, much of this investment
potential can be realized if restrictive regulations, which
require that all investments be prudent and for the sole
benefit of plan participants, are liberalized.8 That is,
unions must push to make pension fund investment in affordable
housing a prudent and productive investment for pension
participants and the communities in which they live.
Ultimately, such efforts will create a more inclusive and
cohesive affordable housing development movement that can work
to partially fill the gap created by the federal government's
retreat from providing housing assistance to low- and
moderate-income people.
'Investment in affordable housing is principally deterred
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).
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